From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 291C53876CC; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:05:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788498322; cv=none; b=j80nToDGXTY26sucJp4od7e/DCD8ALIDDeV0pYiKUxNyEPMh2HPHErPNTalS8C5qQyJZYXlR+VY1DKdYphI6UfP+PLUAlIWIvNQhqR4BYVM9JblXov4h92khRmOj7yJJkh4yPbkGvFxb0A5aa9tCTJRr1Q+EJEn0vLs9LfhhrCY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788498322; c=relaxed/simple; bh=NAa1eXFcF5qsFHWt5kPaLCnOWKTecyFNhi6k5OiQyR0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ehmwAFHRrfNvWi28hu8LevCETLo5C/yQAmI++IMj2kSvOu+xrnw1wLv7s0+K3N4fJry/poXHJXFtY/Re9xT1YDLsywM+xneR8MvvrAW/DBacieMQciY5N41Uk5sA6su7FiOEDQaA65DENXmWo4MPDRhWjxgUmZUfxwhK5c5oMok= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=xwvgR2bE; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="xwvgR2bE" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 81F961F00A3D; Fri, 4 Sep 2026 05:05:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788498321; bh=OIXNCKXLQ900Om1K9mjyG0Lx86/N3hIjOoJbwnq5IGA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=xwvgR2bEx2ZxPnypQzy53s3ITLnUMMwTAMFewBvGa91W/HA6RIxGLzBS8BX34rdyl CtnR8+SyTRtSGkJNNKAKV9FUKJjn/deS3yXrD1yC5+Z+4hEOZrZGd2h4yL876pt27w nETUbNvSqa4MYw2yUhUjnCeaFcr5HW5Z0HO74l3s= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Chen Linxuan , "Christian Brauner (Amutable)" Subject: [PATCH 7.2 021/713] pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 06:49:49 +0200 Message-ID: <20260904045804.300431913@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260904045803.810145556@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260904045803.810145556@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Chen Linxuan commit 9688a46802939da28f00cb40e8129615d5d4af39 upstream. The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor. The accompanying comment states that the code "mirrors nsfs behavior", but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task's exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read. Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target's old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()'d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims. open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller's own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome. Fixes: 5b08bd408534 ("pidfs: allow retrieval of namespace file descriptors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chen Linxuan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731-pidfd-exec-update-lock-v1-1-b388f2f3a8b0@black-desk.cn Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/pidfs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/fs/pidfs.c +++ b/fs/pidfs.c @@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *fil struct task_struct *task __free(put_task) = NULL; struct nsproxy *nsp __free(put_nsproxy) = NULL; struct ns_common *ns_common = NULL; + int error; if (!pidfs_ioctl_valid(cmd)) return -ENOIOCTLCMD; @@ -555,20 +556,33 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *fil if (arg) return -EINVAL; + /* + * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a + * filesystem cred ptrace check. Hold @task's exec_update_lock for the + * duration of the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that the + * credentials used for the access decision match those of @task at the + * time its namespace is read, preventing a concurrent execve() from + * swapping the task's credentials in between the check and the use. We + * mirror nsfs behavior. + */ + error = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; + + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out_unlock; + } + scoped_guard(task_lock, task) { nsp = task->nsproxy; if (nsp) get_nsproxy(nsp); } - if (!nsp) - return -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ - - /* - * We're trying to open a file descriptor to the namespace so perform a - * filesystem cred ptrace check. Also, we mirror nsfs behavior. - */ - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) - return -EACCES; + if (!nsp) { + error = -ESRCH; /* just pretend it didn't exist */ + goto out_unlock; + } switch (cmd) { /* Namespaces that hang of nsproxy. */ @@ -650,11 +664,16 @@ static long pidfd_ioctl(struct file *fil #endif break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + error = -ENOIOCTLCMD; } - if (!ns_common) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!error && !ns_common) + error = -EOPNOTSUPP; + +out_unlock: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + return error; /* open_namespace() unconditionally consumes the reference */ return open_namespace(ns_common);