From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
kpsingh@kernel.org, matt@bobrowski.net, paul@paul-moore.com,
mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
kees@kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, gnoack@google.com, jack@suse.cz,
song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev, martin.lau@linux.dev,
eddyz87@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
m@maowtm.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/15] lsm: Add the bprm_apply_policy_object LSM hook
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 15:37:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260909193719.518517-3-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260909193719.518517-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Add the first policy object operation, applying a policy to the
credentials prepared for an execution:
bprm_apply_policy_object(bprm, object, flags)
The hook is only called between the preparation and the commitment of
the bprm's credentials, i.e. from a bprm_creds_for_exec() or
bprm_creds_from_file() context, where the executed task can still be
arranged to start confined by the policy.
How the policy composes with restrictions the credentials already
carry, and the meaning of @flags, are defined by the implementing
LSM, which must reject unsupported flags with -EINVAL. An LSM with
no notion of applying a policy object to an execution does not
implement the hook, and the calling kfunc fails with -EOPNOTSUPP.
Like the lifetime hooks, this hook is excluded from the "bpf" LSM's
attachment points, as the targeted dispatch makes an attachment there
unreachable.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
---
Notes:
v2->v3:
- No change.
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index d7684407737a..ddb15bea383e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -452,6 +452,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_token_free, struct bpf_token *token)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_cmd, const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, bprm_apply_policy_object, struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ struct lsm_policy_object *object, u32 flags)
LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_from_fd, int fd,
struct lsm_policy_object **object)
LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, policy_object_get, struct lsm_policy_object *object)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index f762cac6838b..f3de70511c0f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_xfrm_decode_session)
#endif
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_ismaclabel)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_apply_policy_object)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_from_fd)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_get)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_policy_object_put)
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-09 19:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-09 19:37 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/15] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/15] lsm: Move the lsm_for_each_hook() macro to security/lsm.h Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 21:34 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-09 22:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 23:08 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_acquire kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_apply_bprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-09 20:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/15] lsm: Document the LSM policy object interface Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/15] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the LSM policy object kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/15] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/15] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 12/15] landlock: Free rulesets after an RCU grace period Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 15/15] landlock: Document the BPF policy interface Justin Suess
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