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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>,
	Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y 7/7] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:07:35 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260916190735.1968203-7-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260916190735.1968203-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 ]

Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in
the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around
(for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in
load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed:

    if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
        pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
        return -E2BIG;
    }

Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a
corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against
stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if
size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size
directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating
large standalone files (>= 2GB).

In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1,
resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an
out-of-bounds null-byte write.

Fix this by:
1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or
   size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd().
2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing
   it to load_xbc_fd().
3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/

Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/bootconfig/main.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c
index 717aa69473a60..f35ee15c19167 100644
--- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c
+++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c
@@ -109,6 +109,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **buf, int size)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	*buf = malloc(size + 1);
 	if (!*buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -137,6 +140,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *path, char **buf)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) {
+		pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path);
+		ret = -E2BIG;
+		close(fd);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size);
 
 	close(fd);
@@ -187,7 +197,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf)
 	csum = le32toh(csum);
 
 	/* Wrong size error  */
-	if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
+	if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX ||
+	    size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
 		pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
 		return -E2BIG;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-16 19:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-16 14:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2026-09-16 19:07 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 1/7] tools/bootconfig: Simplify expression Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 2/7] bootconfig: Change array value to use child node Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 3/7] bootconfig: Share the checksum function with tools Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 4/7] tools/bootconfig: Print all error message in stderr Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 5/7] bootconfig: Replace u16 and u32 with uint16_t and uint32_t Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 6/7] tools/bootconfig: Cleanup bootconfig footer size calculations Sasha Levin
2026-09-16 19:07   ` Sasha Levin [this message]

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