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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-90159: bpf: Disallow bpf_{g,s}etsockopt() in cgroup UNIX getname hooks
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 17:09:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026091725-CVE-2026-90159-bc2b@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Disallow bpf_{g,s}etsockopt() in cgroup UNIX getname hooks

_bpf_setsockopt() and _bpf_getsockopt() call sock_owned_by_me() for
full sockets, so these helpers expect the socket lock to be held.

BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME and BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME run BPF
programs without acquiring the socket lock. A program attached to
either hook can therefore trigger the sock_owned_by_me() warning by
calling bpf_setsockopt() or bpf_getsockopt().

Disallow bpf_setsockopt() and bpf_getsockopt() for CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME
and CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-90159 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.7 with commit 859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 and fixed in 6.12.110 with commit 61769b9c882a964af3a6ebd9a8e43615f8713234
	Issue introduced in 6.7 with commit 859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 and fixed in 6.18.52 with commit fe91c3f64a738dd97e8542ad5bdfbe5ac430edf6
	Issue introduced in 6.7 with commit 859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 and fixed in 7.2.6 with commit daeb74f5f398e847d1d42906aec6610406a34fdc
	Issue introduced in 6.7 with commit 859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 and fixed in 7.3-rc1 with commit 84473a7e1813a2da7b759ab1d098a84998c8d3f5

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-90159
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/core/filter.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61769b9c882a964af3a6ebd9a8e43615f8713234
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe91c3f64a738dd97e8542ad5bdfbe5ac430edf6
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/daeb74f5f398e847d1d42906aec6610406a34fdc
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84473a7e1813a2da7b759ab1d098a84998c8d3f5

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-09-17 16:17 UTC|newest]

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