All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-97411: net: ibm: emac: mal: fix potential system hang in mal_remove()
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:03:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026092425-CVE-2026-97411-c5d5@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ibm: emac: mal: fix potential system hang in mal_remove()

napi_disable() is not idempotent and calling it on an already-disabled
or unenabled NAPI context will cause the kernel to spin indefinitely
waiting for the NAPI_STATE_SCHED bit to clear.

In mal_remove(), napi_disable() is called unconditionally. If no MACs were
registered, NAPI was never enabled. Also, if they were registered but
subsequently unregistered, NAPI was already disabled in
mal_unregister_commac(). In either case, calling napi_disable() causes
the kernel to hang upon module removal.

Fix this by only calling napi_disable() in mal_remove() if the commac list
is not empty (which implies NAPI is enabled).

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-97411 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 6.12.111 with commit f6c1aad9b35fa083f48ce0c5926204891d82e089
	Fixed in 6.18.53 with commit c4cb9a728df66c46067b26263f5beb633aae4087
	Fixed in 7.2 with commit 7c5d41f87f079990bf241359e3c1332d8d10fe87

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-97411
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/emac/mal.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6c1aad9b35fa083f48ce0c5926204891d82e089
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4cb9a728df66c46067b26263f5beb633aae4087
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c5d41f87f079990bf241359e3c1332d8d10fe87

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-09-24 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2026092425-CVE-2026-97411-c5d5@gregkh \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.