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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-97553: xfs: lock the healthmon when inserting unmount event
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 12:22:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026092551-CVE-2026-97553-e14d@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfs: lock the healthmon when inserting unmount event

LOLLM complains that xfs_healthmon_unmount does an unlocked insert of
the unmount event into the health monitor's event list.  Fix that.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-97553 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 7.0 with commit 25ca57fa3624cae9c6b5c6d3fc7f38318ca1402e and fixed in 7.2.7 with commit d963ce1910bc4e23c60a4787af8a3aa3498a053e
	Issue introduced in 7.0 with commit 25ca57fa3624cae9c6b5c6d3fc7f38318ca1402e and fixed in 7.3-rc3 with commit 7538ba528cfd6f176076186c1b1678fdca1c197b

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-97553
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/xfs/xfs_healthmon.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d963ce1910bc4e23c60a4787af8a3aa3498a053e
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7538ba528cfd6f176076186c1b1678fdca1c197b

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-09-25 10:24 UTC|newest]

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