From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,vincenzo.frascino@arm.com,stable@vger.kernel.org,ljs@kernel.org,huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com,glider@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,david@kernel.org,andreyknvl@gmail.com,ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [merged mm-hotfixes-stable] kasan-unpoison-task-stack-below-watermark-only-in-generic-mode.patch removed from -mm tree
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2026 13:55:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260926205541.EBAC41F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kasan: unpoison task stack below watermark only in generic mode
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-unpoison-task-stack-below-watermark-only-in-generic-mode.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Subject: kasan: unpoison task stack below watermark only in generic mode
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:51:13 +0200
CPU resume and BPF exception handling can discard stack frames without
running their compiler-generated epilogues. Generic KASAN needs
kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() to clear the redzones left behind by
those frames before the stack is reused.
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK also enables this helper for SW_TAGS. The helper
derives the stack base from an untagged stack pointer, so kasan_unpoison()
writes KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xff) into the shadow for [base, watermark). For
a vmapped task stack, vm_area->addr still carries the original random
allocation tag. This creates a tag mismatch at the stack base even if
that memory has never held an instrumented stack object.
When the task exits and its stack is not cached, thread_stack_free_rcu()
passes vm_area->addr to vfree(). In RCU callback context this reaches
vfree_atomic(), whose llist_add() writes to the allocation base through
the tagged pointer and triggers a false KASAN invalid-access report:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
Write of size 8 at addr c2ffffc0a8f70000 by task rcuop/7/75
Pointer tag: [c2], memory tag: [ff]
Call trace:
__hwasan_store8_noabort+0xe8/0xf8
vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
vfree+0x220/0x298
thread_stack_free_rcu+0x3c/0x4c
rcu_do_batch+0x308/0xaf0
rcu_nocb_cb_kthread+0x33c/0x708
The deferred-free path started using the tagged vm_area->addr in commit
449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in
vmap stacks code"). Previously it freed the untagged pointer derived from
tsk->stack, so the write was never tag-checked.
SW_TAGS does not need the blanket shadow reset to make subsequent stack
accesses valid: untagged kernel pointers have the match-all 0xff tag, and
the compiler initializes the shadow tags of instrumented stack objects
before use.
Return early unless CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC is enabled. Keep the mode check
in the common helper so it covers both resume and bpf_throw().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260916175113.1327454-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com
Fixes: 449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Shaobo Huang <huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260806123020.90869-1-huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com/
Assisted-by: LLM
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-task-stack-below-watermark-only-in-generic-mode
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -114,12 +114,23 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct ta
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
+ void *base;
+
+ /*
+ * Only the generic mode needs this. In the tag-based mode the
+ * compiler fully initializes the shadow of stack variables on
+ * function entry, so stale tags left below the watermark are
+ * harmless.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ return;
+
/*
* Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
* because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
* yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
*/
- void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+ base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false);
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com are
reply other threads:[~2026-09-26 20:55 UTC|newest]
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