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From: Anthony PERARD <anthony@xenproject.org>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: "Baptiste Le Duc" <baptiste.le-duc@vates.tech>,
	"Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	"Alistair Francis" <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
	"Connor Davis" <connojdavis@gmail.com>,
	"Oleksii Kurochko" <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
	"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger@xenproject.org>,
	"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RESEND v3 2/6] xen/riscv: rename PTE "permissions" to "pte_flags"
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:04:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260930130448.49634-1-anthony@xenproject.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1790699585.8631fc262581453bbf619ec5b2062170.1a0ee033eb9000b504@vates.tech>

From: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@vates.tech>

paddr_to_pte()'s "permissions" parameter, the matching local in
setup_initial_mapping() and p2m_set_permission() don't only deal with
permission bits: they also handle PTE_VALID, PTE_USER, PTE_ACCESSED and
PTE_DIRTY.

Rename them to "pte_flags" and p2m_set_pte_flags() respectively.

No functional change.

Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@vates.tech>
---
 xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/mm.h | 5 +++--
 xen/arch/riscv/mm.c             | 8 ++++----
 xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c            | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/mm.h b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/mm.h
index 9e28c2495462..1ac66283ec9b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/mm.h
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/mm.h
@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ extern vaddr_t directmap_virt_start;
 #define paddr_to_pfn(pa)  ((unsigned long)((pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 
 static inline pte_t paddr_to_pte(paddr_t paddr,
-                                 unsigned int permissions)
+                                 unsigned int pte_flags)
 {
-    return (pte_t) { .pte = (paddr_to_pfn(paddr) << PTE_PPN_SHIFT) | permissions };
+    return (pte_t) { .pte = (paddr_to_pfn(paddr) << PTE_PPN_SHIFT) |
+                            pte_flags };
 }
 
 static inline paddr_t pte_to_paddr(pte_t pte)
diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/mm.c b/xen/arch/riscv/mm.c
index 610d11194588..0e26c5751f17 100644
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/mm.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void __init setup_initial_mapping(struct mmu_desc *mmu_desc,
         case 1: /* Level 0 */
             {
                 unsigned long paddr = (page_addr - map_start) + pa_start;
-                unsigned int permissions = PTE_LEAF_DEFAULT;
+                unsigned int pte_flags = PTE_LEAF_DEFAULT;
                 unsigned long addr = is_identity_mapping
                                      ? page_addr : virt_to_maddr(page_addr);
                 pte_t pte_to_be_written;
@@ -149,13 +149,13 @@ static void __init setup_initial_mapping(struct mmu_desc *mmu_desc,
 
                 if ( is_kernel_text(addr) ||
                      is_kernel_inittext(addr) )
-                        permissions =
+                        pte_flags =
                             PTE_EXECUTABLE | PTE_READABLE | PTE_VALID;
 
                 if ( is_kernel_rodata(addr) )
-                    permissions = PTE_READABLE | PTE_VALID;
+                    pte_flags = PTE_READABLE | PTE_VALID;
 
-                pte_to_be_written = paddr_to_pte(paddr, permissions);
+                pte_to_be_written = paddr_to_pte(paddr, pte_flags);
 
                 if ( !pte_is_valid(pgtbl[index]) )
                     pgtbl[index] = pte_to_be_written;
diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
index 1cea86512c8c..f7b380b90a4e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static inline void p2m_clean_pte(pte_t *p, bool clean_cache)
     p2m_write_pte(p, pte, clean_cache);
 }
 
-static void p2m_set_permission(pte_t *e, p2m_type_t t)
+static void p2m_set_pte_flags(pte_t *e, p2m_type_t t)
 {
     e->pte &= ~PTE_ACCESS_MASK;
 
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ static pte_t p2m_pte_from_mfn(mfn_t mfn, p2m_type_t t,
             break;
         }
 
-        p2m_set_permission(&e, t);
+        p2m_set_pte_flags(&e, t);
         p2m_set_type(&e, t, ctx);
     }
     else
-- 
Anthony PERARD



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-30 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-29 16:29 [PATCH v3 0/6] xen/riscv: fix boot on missing extensions and MMU setup bugs Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] docs/riscv: sync required ISA extensions with required_extensions[] Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30  6:18   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 10:32   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] xen/riscv: rename PTE "permissions" to "pte_flags" Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 12:07   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 12:42     ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 12:50       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 12:46     ` [PATCH v3.1 " Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 12:51       ` Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 13:34     ` [PATCH v3 " Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-30 13:04   ` Anthony PERARD [this message]
2026-09-30 13:42   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-30 13:54     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 13:56       ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-10-01  7:41     ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] xen/riscv: fix A/D bit handling in G-stage mappings Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 12:20   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 13:53     ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-30 13:58       ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 14:03         ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] xen/riscv: fix A/D bits in Xen's page-table mappings Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 12:23   ` Jan Beulich
2026-09-30 14:37   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] xen/riscv: use pte_is_valid() in pte_is_mapping() Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 10:45   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-09-29 16:32 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] xen/riscv: make Zihintpause no longer a required extension Baptiste Le Duc
2026-09-30 10:43   ` Oleksii Kurochko

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