From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BBDD73769FB; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:17:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790788672; cv=none; b=ntaNTwgXpsDdG1/w/m8xtjINMdFCRkpMgEgVpCXVQ3VLGUJdUng0nthiasNA+bL5huv+KB4QggLwDgtlJyyv6j+wvZGUjuoh7ym9Rth5Q/kQpb6VDdGn8IP/R+5YxTDs8tIpfhyQ0EasRocx7Nl33njgbtOuSsqds0wtdr9nZvg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790788672; c=relaxed/simple; bh=q1Du138MfACrlSC424Is6BmAC6BlzY3GkGjd/MDZ1uU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=H+StdQn9M/Av2ot15jg1g/WqztWzlVEoItgkXEEWExYnHHxabymK2SGIZZcPb701TWNnjmVEmJ8WMtHEJe+StQsPk8Y9/oWUImzn8rhSZ8WZVgvXnR5+tNhLIlI98pFK5vtRgPC3IMFDOCdI+gIYj+3Hgvik4xvIS9vRKi5CK/o= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=A2whJcoK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="A2whJcoK" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B30AF1F000FF; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:17:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1790788671; bh=5jtxSEXEe4s2978P2KLsjSEEwo46mJP6KrivBNdwgt0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=A2whJcoKtGJ1sOjYJjSnKMXVq6mpBUXfJL7yo+EWDh9nYaBCVHcpmOzZPM7wVZOeZ 0B9WoAaVxexFZezn362+c78bJmi7RU1HWpUgRSCf1PHSi2/r24LY+vCMhDV/oYtylp gwLJb/iPs0OW6o8IdkVXLPVpABgLgM0I+Cr3/0eM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Cen Zhang , Francis Perron , Jarkko Sakkinen , R Nageswara Sastry Subject: [PATCH 6.12 205/877] KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:18:36 +0200 Message-ID: <20260930152419.147398092@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Cen Zhang commit 8697c431e297eb0d0ab13dda6bc172b48a34f05c upstream. encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key description into the undersized buffer. The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination, and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation. Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang Signed-off-by: Francis Perron Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260909153433.83117-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -606,6 +607,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *enc { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; unsigned short datablob_len; + unsigned short payload_totallen; unsigned short decrypted_datalen; unsigned short payload_datalen; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; @@ -659,16 +661,22 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *enc encrypted_datalen = roundup(decrypted_datalen, blksize); - datablob_len = format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1 - + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1 + encrypted_datalen; + if (check_add_overflow(format_len + 1 + strlen(master_desc) + 1 + + strlen(datalen) + 1 + ivsize + 1, + encrypted_datalen, &datablob_len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (check_add_overflow(datablob_len, + payload_datalen + HASH_SIZE + 1, + &payload_totallen)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_datalen + datablob_len - + HASH_SIZE + 1); + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, payload_totallen); if (ret < 0) return ERR_PTR(ret); - epayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*epayload) + payload_datalen + - datablob_len + HASH_SIZE + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + epayload = kzalloc_flex(*epayload, payload_data, payload_totallen, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!epayload) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);