From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 221FE54EEAD; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:42:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790790140; cv=none; b=ILedUHes9TR+RFY/Q7ctJnjJFhc0P3OsLigumj9gcDd7qT69Pft8C+1H7GuJbZKR0L2hWxlt4xOdK2TKvGZEPvboNDCgnlbWZkuV4eeExQEokVSVwYYD4UpT2Yuc4qPPglOOorXUgLEYxhgjfVb/kSdQTRa/1FtH00ptxmuFd9o= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790790140; c=relaxed/simple; bh=jQXnmUvZfON16SnLz9WBhk/iQ6Cdikz4SzBOrm/vOGc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=PrrGB6ymP7gW50g091QHkxIA0gLsfZOM1dbiR4LxsJjfxikgfjwikSp9uDUWV8qEdltj3T+/Q091IrS0M5ytIiI3RjfjGPr/1s0WHAT3jzy4U9nYq3Sz5xwYk9PFENdEae2R9l1oCzrwmND7ppsIb7gFNvCNSfgFfN9NKrkZ62Y= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=YTKll6G2; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="YTKll6G2" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 41FFA1F000FF; Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:42:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1790790138; bh=j0f1/03GoHQKdZMhxGzKmxIinD10X+YSkSmQO4H3IJw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=YTKll6G2Dbm316kCILAkqcJMTY6HanuGVBwG7nT6TH4+YsOrVdDoMcHg0sEH6B6OP jZkN0ki/nHxljx0/aO/cq/YIRKNhF+F3tn7BQxLK/C7yc0eueojNgGKlg/g8LVilxf AnzbCh3RF3Hf37q1F2/jcN72Hxvk/BBi3PKNwMn0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Sashiko , "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" , Sang-Heon Jeon , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 723/877] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:27:14 +0200 Message-ID: <20260930152430.289601669@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260930152414.738996857@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" [ Upstream commit 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 ] Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around (for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed: if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating large standalone files (>= 2GB). In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1, resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an out-of-bounds null-byte write. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd(). 2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing it to load_xbc_fd(). 3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/ Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/ Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/bootconfig/main.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c +++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c @@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **bu { int ret; + if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + *buf = malloc(size + 1); if (!*buf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -167,6 +170,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *pat return ret; } + if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) { + pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path); + ret = -E2BIG; + close(fd); + return ret; + } + ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size); close(fd); @@ -217,7 +227,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, csum = le32toh(csum); /* Wrong size error */ - if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { + if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX || + size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; }