All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Pedro Falcato" <pfalcato@suse.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	"Simon Horman" <horms@kernel.org>,
	"Willem de Bruijn" <willemb@google.com>,
	"Jason Xing" <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, "Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuniyu@google.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	"Harry Yoo (Meta)" <harry@kernel.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Hao Li" <hao.li@linux.dev>, "Christoph Lameter" <cl@gentwo.org>,
	"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Roman Gushchin" <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	"Johannes Weiner" <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	"Shakeel Butt" <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
	"Muchun Song" <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
	"Mina Almasry" <almasrymina@google.com>,
	"Björn Töpel" <bjorn@kernel.org>,
	"Jiayuan Chen" <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net-next v5 7/7] net: skb: isolate skb data area allocations into a separate bucket
Date: Fri,  2 Oct 2026 16:11:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261002231132.1646573-7-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261002231120.late.500-kees@kernel.org>

From: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>

SKB data area allocations (as done from alloc_skb()) use kmalloc().
These allocations can be variably sized and their contents can be more
or less controlled from userspace, which makes them useful for attackers
that want to overwrite a use-after-free'd object from the same kmalloc slab
(which often just requires the sizes to roughly match into the same kmalloc
bucket). [0] is an easy example of an exploit that uses netlink skb
allocation to target another similarly-sized accidentally freed object.

While other mitigations like CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES exist, these are
probabilistic. Use the existing kmem buckets API to further isolate these
allocations in a guaranteed fashion, when CONFIG_SLAB_BUCKETS=y.

Ask for the accounted kmalloc type as well as the normal one. AF_UNIX
sets sk_allocation to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so without it every AF_UNIX
skb data area would fall back to the general caches, and those are the
ones most worth isolating. GFP_DMA is left to fall back, being passed to
an skb allocator only by rare devices.

Link: https://github.com/google/security-research/blob/master/pocs/linux/kernelctf/CVE-2023-4207_lts_cos_mitigation_2/docs/exploit.md [0]
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 966af3beed94..e0660b2dbc19 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -586,6 +586,8 @@ struct sk_buff *napi_build_skb(void *data, unsigned int frag_size)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(napi_build_skb);
 
+static kmem_buckets *skb_data_buckets __ro_after_init;
+
 static void *kmalloc_pfmemalloc(size_t obj_size, gfp_t flags, int node)
 {
 	if (!gfp_pfmemalloc_allowed(flags))
@@ -593,7 +595,8 @@ static void *kmalloc_pfmemalloc(size_t obj_size, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	if (!obj_size)
 		return kmem_cache_alloc_node(net_hotdata.skb_small_head_cache,
 					     flags, node);
-	return kmalloc_node_track_caller(obj_size, flags, node);
+	return kmem_buckets_alloc_node_track_caller(skb_data_buckets, obj_size,
+						    flags, node);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -634,7 +637,7 @@ static void *kmalloc_reserve(unsigned int *size, gfp_t flags, int node,
 	 * Try a regular allocation, when that fails and we're not entitled
 	 * to the reserves, fail.
 	 */
-	obj = kmalloc_node_track_caller(obj_size,
+	obj = kmem_buckets_alloc_node_track_caller(skb_data_buckets, obj_size,
 					flags | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN,
 					node);
 	if (likely(obj))
@@ -5235,6 +5238,10 @@ void __init skb_init(void)
 						0,
 						SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM,
 						NULL);
+	skb_data_buckets = kmem_buckets_create_types("skb_data", 0, SLAB_PANIC,
+						     0, INT_MAX, NULL,
+						     BIT(KMEM_BUCKET_NORMAL) |
+						     BIT(KMEM_BUCKET_CGROUP));
 	skb_extensions_init();
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-02 23:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-02 23:11 [PATCH net-next v5 0/7] net: skb: isolate skb data area allocations into a separate bucket Kees Cook
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 1/7] mm/slab: Mark the kmem_buckets_create() context as a Context: section Kees Cook
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 2/7] mm/slab: Let kmem_buckets_create() take an alignment Kees Cook
2026-10-03 23:13   ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 3/7] mm/slab: Add kmem_buckets_destroy() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 23:13   ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 4/7] mm/slab: Add tests for the existing kmem_buckets behaviour Kees Cook
2026-10-03 23:13   ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 5/7] mm/slab: Provide kmalloc type fallback for bucket allocations Kees Cook
2026-10-03 23:13   ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-02 23:11 ` [PATCH net-next v5 6/7] mm/slab: Let a bucket set handle __GFP_ACCOUNT Kees Cook
2026-10-03 23:13   ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-02 23:11 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2026-10-03 23:13   ` [PATCH net-next v5 7/7] net: skb: isolate skb data area allocations into a separate bucket netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-10-09  1:40 ` [PATCH net-next v5 0/7] " Jakub Kicinski
2026-10-09  4:59   ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261002231132.1646573-7-kees@kernel.org \
    --to=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=almasrymina@google.com \
    --cc=bjorn@kernel.org \
    --cc=cgroups@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=cl@gentwo.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=hannes@cmpxchg.org \
    --cc=hao.li@linux.dev \
    --cc=harry@kernel.org \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=jiayuan.chen@linux.dev \
    --cc=kerneljasonxing@gmail.com \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=kuniyu@google.com \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mhocko@kernel.org \
    --cc=muchun.song@linux.dev \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=pfalcato@suse.de \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=roman.gushchin@linux.dev \
    --cc=shakeel.butt@linux.dev \
    --cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
    --cc=willemb@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.