All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,piaojun@huawei.com,mark@fasheh.com,junxiao.bi@oracle.com,joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com,jlbec@evilplan.org,heming.zhao@suse.com,gechangwei@live.cn,gality369@gmail.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [merged mm-nonmm-stable] ocfs2-reject-inconsistent-local-xattr-entries.patch removed from -mm tree
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:04:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261007020402.1DD7C1F0089B@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)


The quilt patch titled
     Subject: ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     ocfs2-reject-inconsistent-local-xattr-entries.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Subject: ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 16:50:12 +0800

[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can set OCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCAL while
keeping xe_value_size larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. When that
entry reaches namevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem hits its BUG_ON:

kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:namevalue_size_xe fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2e4/0x330 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1638
Call Trace:
 ocfs2_xa_wipe_namevalue fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1470 [inline]
 ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0xae/0x1d0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1941
 ocfs2_xa_remove fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2043 [inline]
 ocfs2_xa_set+0x11a8/0x30a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2247
 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x302/0xc50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2795
 __ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x7e6/0xdb0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3416
 ocfs2_xattr_set+0x1447/0x2610 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3650
 ocfs2_xattr_security_set+0x37/0x50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:7241
 __vfs_removexattr+0x14d/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:518
 cap_inode_killpriv+0x29/0x50 security/commoncap.c:355
 security_inode_killpriv+0x105/0x220 security/security.c:2724
 setattr_prepare+0x147/0x8a0 fs/attr.c:219
 ocfs2_setattr+0x504/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1148
 notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546
 do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68
 handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline]
 do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline]
 path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
 do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
 do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
 ...

[CAUSE]
namevalue_size_xe() assumes that local entries contain an inline value
no larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. Existing xattr metadata
validation only checks whether the value fits the storage region, and
cached entries can reach lookup and bucket maintenance paths without a
semantic check. A corrupt entry can therefore be passed to
namevalue_size_xe().

[FIX]
Validate the local/value-size invariant in the existing flat and bucket
metadata validators and before accepting matched entries or traversing
bucket entries in paths that call namevalue_size_xe(). Return an OCFS2
corruption error instead of firing the assertion.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260806085012.2650042-1-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
---

 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c~ocfs2-reject-inconsistent-local-xattr-entries
+++ a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -237,6 +237,21 @@ static int namevalue_size_xe(struct ocfs
 	return namevalue_size(xe->xe_name_len, value_len);
 }
 
+static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,
+				      struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)
+{
+	u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+	if (value_len > OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE &&
+	    ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe))
+		return ocfs2_error(sb,
+				   "Invalid local xattr in block %llu: value size %llu\n",
+				   (unsigned long long)blkno,
+				   (unsigned long long)value_len);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 
 static int ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_name_value(struct super_block *sb,
 					     struct ocfs2_xattr_header *xh,
@@ -989,7 +1004,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_
 	size_t entries_limit = region_size;
 	size_t nv_limit = region_size;
 	size_t max_entries;
-	int i;
+	int i, ret;
 
 	if (region_size < sizeof(*xh))
 		return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1009,6 +1024,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_
 		struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];
 		size_t name_offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
 		size_t value_offset;
+		u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+		ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(sb, blkno, xe);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 
 		if (name_offset > nv_limit ||
 		    xe->xe_name_len > nv_limit - name_offset)
@@ -1023,8 +1043,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_
 					   (unsigned long long)blkno, i);
 
 		if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe)) {
-			if (le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size) >
-			    nv_limit - value_offset)
+			if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset)
 				return ocfs2_error(sb,
 						   "Invalid xattr in block %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n",
 						   (unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1109,7 +1128,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(s
 	size_t entries_limit = sb->s_blocksize;
 	size_t nv_limit = sb->s_blocksize;
 	size_t max_entries;
-	int i;
+	int i, ret;
 
 	if (region_size < sizeof(*xh))
 		return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1137,6 +1156,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(s
 		size_t block_off = name_offset >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
 		size_t block_offset = name_offset % nv_limit;
 		size_t value_offset;
+		u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+		ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(sb, blkno, xe);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 
 		if (name_offset >= region_size || block_off >= bucket->bu_blocks)
 			return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1155,8 +1179,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(s
 					   (unsigned long long)blkno, i);
 
 		if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe)) {
-			if (le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size) >
-			    nv_limit - value_offset)
+			if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset)
 				return ocfs2_error(sb,
 						   "Invalid xattr bucket %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n",
 						   (unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1304,7 +1327,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct
 {
 	struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;
 	size_t name_len;
-	int i, name_offset, cmp = 1;
+	int i, name_offset, cmp = 1, ret;
 
 	if (name == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1327,6 +1350,12 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct
 				return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 			}
 			cmp = memcmp(name, (xs->base + name_offset), name_len);
+			if (!cmp) {
+				ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb,
+								 OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno, entry);
+				if (ret)
+					return ret;
+			}
 		}
 		if (cmp == 0)
 			break;
@@ -4068,6 +4097,10 @@ static int ocfs2_find_xe_in_bucket(struc
 
 		xe_name = bucket_block(bucket, block_off) + new_offset;
 		if (!memcmp(name, xe_name, name_len)) {
+			ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb,
+							 OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno, xe);
+			if (ret)
+				break;
 			*xe_index = i;
 			*found = 1;
 			ret = 0;
@@ -4705,6 +4738,9 @@ static int ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket(str
 	xe = xh->xh_entries;
 	end = OCFS2_XATTR_BUCKET_SIZE;
 	for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(xh->xh_count); i++, xe++) {
+		ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb, blkno, xe);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
 		offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
 		len = namevalue_size_xe(xe);
 
@@ -4987,6 +5023,9 @@ static int ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket(str
 	name_value_len = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < start; i++) {
 		xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];
+		ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb, blk, xe);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
 		name_value_len += namevalue_size_xe(xe);
 		if (le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset) < name_offset)
 			name_offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from gality369@gmail.com are



                 reply	other threads:[~2026-10-07  2:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261007020402.1DD7C1F0089B@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=gality369@gmail.com \
    --cc=gechangwei@live.cn \
    --cc=heming.zhao@suse.com \
    --cc=jlbec@evilplan.org \
    --cc=joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com \
    --cc=junxiao.bi@oracle.com \
    --cc=mark@fasheh.com \
    --cc=mm-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=piaojun@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.