From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4D5BF2AF1D; Fri, 9 Oct 2026 14:19:17 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791555561; cv=none; b=TaBG4Ph1iZkbqbmArJ8V4foafVzmOw2PC0HWyUFQq2essQhjG8Oj3v8ZZvIU53tKSo1q9VspnXjEReOGc/Nyy51H0JA0SDr7lX3MFjxx7jVe+4i1fmTCdj8i1MNqzzgtX0OhmLqsGNgkRGp165uC2VxjPbfCErZP946TlGlL0N4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791555561; c=relaxed/simple; bh=s82U54QLoKuZhh1SliWKH8zlCBkJ6s8ijHnjeJXu4T8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=KB2VkBsRupV9PbMzZXgGELCRH6JW6HxwNl9z82UzoLI8VEo7wiKeTA/oLForkSJlpwoNso7nKyYq6fJ5u1a9fxZJyfSxUEidM85lKsGdqfWt2j8zv7GSzhiy3bGmhymy0nNLPbIpOzFC58ysu1QFiZLnVk+lBmRs1xxCY/iuyEI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Mss15wWa; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Mss15wWa" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9560C1F000FF; Fri, 9 Oct 2026 14:19:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1791555557; bh=r46CrI2cmpam0r3Qar+fFUaL4adJ0+lh0TEFIFoUttk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Mss15wWaCWlqhp/GYDXB60uO7/eo5pK128ltZx3rd72bJniRpnT3UDcNFpyT8yMac uNCYltf6DBAQibqYyqEotdffCxd7Rw2Bc7mdr4McpH+B4wYVy0MRp1LdpKFk9Hmu8Z KFIw/LLdCuaZxDPED+FAZeDQ9awwGObRAvKT7C9g= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Andrey Ryabinin , Andrew Morton , Shaobo Huang , Alexander Potapenko , Andrey Konovalov , David Hildenbrand , Dmitry Vyukov , Lorenzo Stoakes , Vincenzo Frascino Subject: [PATCH 7.2 028/428] kasan: unpoison task stack below watermark only in generic mode Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 16:06:05 +0200 Message-ID: <20261009140946.693773862@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261009140946.008206689@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261009140946.008206689@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Andrey Ryabinin commit 22ab0647764c38924669673634ae333578d77768 upstream. CPU resume and BPF exception handling can discard stack frames without running their compiler-generated epilogues. Generic KASAN needs kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() to clear the redzones left behind by those frames before the stack is reused. CONFIG_KASAN_STACK also enables this helper for SW_TAGS. The helper derives the stack base from an untagged stack pointer, so kasan_unpoison() writes KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xff) into the shadow for [base, watermark). For a vmapped task stack, vm_area->addr still carries the original random allocation tag. This creates a tag mismatch at the stack base even if that memory has never held an instrumented stack object. When the task exits and its stack is not cached, thread_stack_free_rcu() passes vm_area->addr to vfree(). In RCU callback context this reaches vfree_atomic(), whose llist_add() writes to the allocation base through the tagged pointer and triggers a false KASAN invalid-access report: BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150 Write of size 8 at addr c2ffffc0a8f70000 by task rcuop/7/75 Pointer tag: [c2], memory tag: [ff] Call trace: __hwasan_store8_noabort+0xe8/0xf8 vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150 vfree+0x220/0x298 thread_stack_free_rcu+0x3c/0x4c rcu_do_batch+0x308/0xaf0 rcu_nocb_cb_kthread+0x33c/0x708 The deferred-free path started using the tagged vm_area->addr in commit 449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code"). Previously it freed the untagged pointer derived from tsk->stack, so the write was never tag-checked. SW_TAGS does not need the blanket shadow reset to make subsequent stack accesses valid: untagged kernel pointers have the match-all 0xff tag, and the compiler initializes the shadow tags of instrumented stack objects before use. Return early unless CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC is enabled. Keep the mode check in the common helper so it covers both resume and bpf_throw(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260916175113.1327454-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com Fixes: 449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reported-by: Shaobo Huang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260806123020.90869-1-huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com/ Assisted-by: LLM Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Vincenzo Frascino Cc: Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -114,12 +114,23 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct ta /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) { + void *base; + + /* + * Only the generic mode needs this. In the tag-based mode the + * compiler fully initializes the shadow of stack variables on + * function entry, so stale tags left below the watermark are + * harmless. + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) + return; + /* * Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current' * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't * yet set up the percpu register (%gs). */ - void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)); + base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)); kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false); }