From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 59B6B43DECD; Tue, 13 Oct 2026 12:31:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791894675; cv=none; b=ktZnokBlJB6iG2TynzhLEzrIfnvjIfxQbnh7nhKrbiDvbumhojafcwUGByf0FK+vQ4Q2FNSv2+vJ2p2O0nM2E0tUkN5/CDZXoUs8TWK+x7rD83yQt7/iOyL6n0X3UtKDJwGJeJmruFlP3w8IzVpLjj5s2ky/s91kX7nCGPtmQR0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791894675; c=relaxed/simple; bh=5b5yFy1d3VO+fsejN/7Kfp/ctgdfxQm7mQzM6NLB75k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=mz2bv6bcOe6ftoF6MQj2hFadJn7oOJ3EQmZEYaEW+5EO7Xhh8gHGG9bP1+lZVzJUvrM3XvsC1vEt7rEqJzkdEvynIr9fInft0YcHMvt+jgMNB7CarS1IQFzNQ/VVU31wvgaXuuD/CZBfYknlUmor1p4jmWuzog/1xOOKnNKTHkw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=blOD2c7a; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="blOD2c7a" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B0E801F000FF; Tue, 13 Oct 2026 12:31:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1791894674; bh=b8be8no9NJIfn/VBTkXidyfqrhqiOGByGQCANYLz91g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=blOD2c7auki2pFzI57KdRmFN65nGGNi6IqnI1SaOU3CWrg3lwSerKAooxBwVbVSQW G0tst0Bjx8Z3dXR0/Xw98C2INUn8G4lszelzBqLn6H9PVnEyDYIPsltx/rV/FRUVuz XVb9L4zwRP4Yo/CeKXrKQwqmZa4m/i9lXHxmnvS4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Luxing Yin , Zihan Xi , Frank Sorenson , Paulo Alcantara , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 019/497] smb: client: close completed creates on compound wait errors Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 13:33:06 +0200 Message-ID: <20261013112908.335193978@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261013112907.864180619@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261013112907.864180619@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi [ Upstream commit 6c5c547f037bc18f0b8d0b5db5a648f8f630ce85 ] compound_send_recv() waits for responses in order. If a later wait is interrupted, or if a later MID fails during response synchronization, an earlier CREATE may already have opened a remote handle. The earlier mid is then released without invoking handle_cancelled_mid(), leaving the remote handle open because no FID was copied to the caller. Mark completed earlier mids as cancelled when a compound wait or MID synchronization aborts. Keep their response buffers attached while the MIDs are synchronized, and transfer them only after synchronization of the processed responses, so the release path can inspect successful CREATE responses and queue SMB2_close() after a later failure. Account for a remote open only after the close work is allocated and before it is queued, since the caller has not yet updated num_remote_opens. Mark the create+close compound used by smb2_unlink() so it is not closed again. Non-CREATE responses and compounds that already include a close keep their existing behavior. Fixes: e0bba0b85481 ("cifs: add compound_send_recv()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: LLM Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Tested-by: Frank Sorenson Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara [ replaced the upstream cancellation helper with inline loops using midQ and MID_WAIT_CANCELLED under server->mid_lock. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 9 +++-- fs/smb/client/transport.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c index f4a38b0ce8402..23320b794b177 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c @@ -818,7 +818,8 @@ smb2_cancelled_close_fid(struct work_struct *work) */ static int __smb2_handle_cancelled_cmd(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, __u16 cmd, __u64 mid, - __u64 persistent_fid, __u64 volatile_fid) + __u64 persistent_fid, __u64 volatile_fid, + bool account_remote_open) { struct close_cancelled_open *cancelled; @@ -832,6 +833,8 @@ __smb2_handle_cancelled_cmd(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, __u16 cmd, __u64 mid, cancelled->cmd = cmd; cancelled->mid = mid; INIT_WORK(&cancelled->work, smb2_cancelled_close_fid); + if (account_remote_open) + atomic_inc(&tcon->num_remote_opens); WARN_ON(queue_work(cifsiod_wq, &cancelled->work) == false); return 0; @@ -868,7 +871,7 @@ smb2_handle_cancelled_close(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, __u64 persistent_fid, spin_unlock(&tcon->tc_lock); rc = __smb2_handle_cancelled_cmd(tcon, SMB2_CLOSE_HE, 0, - persistent_fid, volatile_fid); + persistent_fid, volatile_fid, false); if (rc) cifs_put_tcon(tcon, netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_cancelled_close); @@ -896,7 +899,7 @@ smb2_handle_cancelled_mid(struct mid_q_entry *mid, struct TCP_Server_Info *serve le16_to_cpu(hdr->Command), le64_to_cpu(hdr->MessageId), rsp->PersistentFileId, - rsp->VolatileFileId); + rsp->VolatileFileId, true); if (rc) cifs_put_tcon(tcon, netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_cancelled_mid); diff --git a/fs/smb/client/transport.c b/fs/smb/client/transport.c index 14dacf2967146..48d382eaadcbe 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/transport.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/transport.c @@ -1084,6 +1084,7 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, int *resp_buf_type, struct kvec *resp_iov) { int i, j, optype, rc = 0; + int num_processed = 0; struct mid_q_entry *midQ[MAX_COMPOUND]; bool cancelled_mid[MAX_COMPOUND] = {false}; struct cifs_credits credits[MAX_COMPOUND] = { @@ -1226,6 +1227,17 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, break; } if (rc != 0) { + /* + * A completed CREATE earlier in the compound chain may have + * opened a remote handle even though a later wait was + * interrupted. Mark it cancelled so __release_mid() invokes + * the existing unmatched-open cleanup. + */ + spin_lock(&server->mid_lock); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + midQ[j]->mid_flags |= MID_WAIT_CANCELLED; + spin_unlock(&server->mid_lock); + for (; i < num_rqst; i++) { cifs_server_dbg(FYI, "Cancelling wait for mid %llu cmd: %d\n", midQ[i]->mid, le16_to_cpu(midQ[i]->command)); @@ -1248,6 +1260,17 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, rc = cifs_sync_mid_result(midQ[i], server); if (rc != 0) { + /* + * A previous CREATE may have completed before this + * response failed. Mark it cancelled so its remote + * handle is closed when the mid is released. + */ + spin_lock(&server->mid_lock); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + midQ[j]->mid_flags |= MID_WAIT_CANCELLED; + spin_unlock(&server->mid_lock); + /* Keep their response buffers for cancelled-mid cleanup. */ + num_processed = 0; /* mark this mid as cancelled to not free it below */ cancelled_mid[i] = true; goto out; @@ -1257,9 +1280,26 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, midQ[i]->mid_state != MID_RESPONSE_READY) { rc = -EIO; cifs_dbg(FYI, "Bad MID state?\n"); + spin_lock(&server->mid_lock); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + midQ[j]->mid_flags |= MID_WAIT_CANCELLED; + spin_unlock(&server->mid_lock); + num_processed = 0; goto out; } + rc = server->ops->check_receive(midQ[i], server, + flags & CIFS_LOG_ERROR); + num_processed = i + 1; + } + +out: + /* + * Delay moving response buffers out of their mids until response + * synchronization completes. This lets cancelled-mid cleanup inspect + * an earlier CREATE response if a later MID fails. + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_processed; i++) { buf = (char *)midQ[i]->resp_buf; resp_iov[i].iov_base = buf; resp_iov[i].iov_len = midQ[i]->resp_buf_size + @@ -1270,33 +1310,30 @@ compound_send_recv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses, else resp_buf_type[i] = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER; - rc = server->ops->check_receive(midQ[i], server, - flags & CIFS_LOG_ERROR); - /* mark it so buf will not be freed by delete_mid */ if ((flags & CIFS_NO_RSP_BUF) == 0) midQ[i]->resp_buf = NULL; - } /* * Compounding is never used during session establish. */ - spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); - if ((ses->ses_status == SES_NEW) || (optype & CIFS_NEG_OP) || (optype & CIFS_SESS_OP)) { - struct kvec iov = { - .iov_base = resp_iov[0].iov_base, - .iov_len = resp_iov[0].iov_len - }; - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); - cifs_server_lock(server); - smb311_update_preauth_hash(ses, server, &iov, 1); - cifs_server_unlock(server); + if (num_processed == num_rqst) { spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); + if ((ses->ses_status == SES_NEW) || (optype & CIFS_NEG_OP) || (optype & CIFS_SESS_OP)) { + struct kvec iov = { + .iov_base = resp_iov[0].iov_base, + .iov_len = resp_iov[0].iov_len + }; + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); + cifs_server_lock(server); + smb311_update_preauth_hash(ses, server, &iov, 1); + cifs_server_unlock(server); + spin_lock(&ses->ses_lock); + } + spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); } - spin_unlock(&ses->ses_lock); -out: /* * This will dequeue all mids. After this it is important that the * demultiplex_thread will not process any of these mids any further. -- 2.53.0