From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BDA003AAF69; Sat, 17 Oct 2026 16:51:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1792255888; cv=none; b=cKd5uAy8pUOWOKX1OU7r7ltN3BwEhHqmGlc0ZwkBUwMXjGBe4ge+RNKQFrhAEj+EAlZvBSiNDejHPneisICJD9b5mAQYj2MwU/HgCyyS8jCHIg+DraRRpADxzoCPXTFA/DA5m9pHK0rS4mv+eNz18lzjhQZJIFO9X1ranc7d04g= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1792255888; c=relaxed/simple; bh=zS6l+3roORa5gM5k5jjBgVcWFylXb7L74ZPAzqoRp8M=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=cYBjJfI38YWC1VZ3LBIRRo/762xtc6a2L3LoDdfr09z5s4hb9IxJmXueKvSR5SuqQTNWnxvefbEicuBfXbetL9mrRfOTWWWiLfyTaeF1qxxDiycj/GtoATJys0ekodQGj0j4suC04nPoQEGletHGZf91yzkjwiEQvhHz4LNgUNE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=MOzXh+jU; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="MOzXh+jU" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0CF441F000C4; Sat, 17 Oct 2026 16:51:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1792255887; bh=apBLgVBv9KDcNwfuhm9B/D+dJd7XkwZZ7yE4v9iJEkI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=MOzXh+jUJmq3KVIjx+g8cMorz9Dk953mt1cEqbk4m/MlvChdQGyH2oE70ndaTCFi5 LHdvItLOdXUL17QoWf89G9RxIhvrEAfFYyoPkIFs7ZMaNEQoB9YuEzOqLi2KdV7rYq EmLO/4kHD4wmgFb7R2T2MqyFTeIrPIG9op8x61LY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Chengfeng Ye , Jarkko Sakkinen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6 0053/1674] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 17:38:45 +0200 Message-ID: <20261017160432.501392487@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261017160431.119607952@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261017160431.119607952@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Chengfeng Ye [ Upstream commit 5e2d672280d97d83de43031d93761b12dadd7b8a ] trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510 Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed. Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260731140925.2973492-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen [ preserved the additional trusted_shash_release() cleanup after unregister_key_type() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index ddcbfaede6849..3b1ee879419c4 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1058,10 +1058,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void) static void trusted_tpm_exit(void) { if (chip) { + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); put_device(&chip->dev); kfree(digests); trusted_shash_release(); - unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); } } -- 2.53.0