[LTP] [PATCH v5 14/14] fchroot13: test failfs entry when chrooted

[Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>]

From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

Verify that unprivileged fchroot() into failfs is refused when the
process is already chrooted: moving the root of a chrooted task into
failfs would allow it to escape its chroot via openat(fd, "..") with
a pre-opened directory fd, so the kernel refuses the syscall with
EPERM.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
 runtest/syscalls                              |  1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore  |  1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot13.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+)

diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index bd3bbff4a..2bdb4a9a2 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ fchroot09 fchroot09
 fchroot10 fchroot10
 fchroot11 fchroot11
 fchroot12 fchroot12
+fchroot13 fchroot13
 
 fcntl01 fcntl01
 fcntl01_64 fcntl01_64
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
index e8a6730ee..3e77e3762 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/.gitignore
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ fchroot09
 fchroot10
 fchroot11
 fchroot12
+fchroot13
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot13.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot13.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ea361ff6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fchroot/fchroot13.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2026 SUSE LLC Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test that unprivileged :manpage:`fchroot(2)` into failfs is refused
+ * when the process is already chrooted.
+ *
+ * The root directory is what confines ".." resolution and the failfs root
+ * can never be reached by walking up a real mount tree. Moving the root
+ * of a chrooted task into failfs would allow it to escape its chroot via
+ * :manpage:`openat(2)` with ".." and a pre-opened directory file descriptor,
+ * so the kernel refuses the syscall with ``EPERM``.
+ *
+ * Root is required to create the chroot jail before dropping to an
+ * unprivileged user in the forked child.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/fcntl.h"
+#include "lapi/prctl.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+
+#define JAILDIR "jail"
+
+static struct passwd *ltpuser;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+	if (SAFE_FORK())
+		return;
+
+	SAFE_CHROOT(JAILDIR);
+	SAFE_CHDIR("/");
+
+	SAFE_SETRESUID(ltpuser->pw_uid, ltpuser->pw_uid,
+		ltpuser->pw_uid);
+
+	SAFE_PRCTL(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+
+	TST_EXP_FAIL(tst_syscall(__NR_fchroot, FD_FAILFS_ROOT, 0),
+		EPERM, "fchroot() from a chrooted process");
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+	ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+	SAFE_MKDIR(JAILDIR, 0755);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.setup = setup,
+	.test_all = run,
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.needs_tmpdir = 1,
+	.forks_child = 1,
+};

-- 
2.51.0


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