From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selftests/exec: check that user namespaces keep the exec securebits
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:53:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261026-work-securebits-userns-v1-2-b35473fa1a34@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261026-work-securebits-userns-v1-0-b35473fa1a34@kernel.org>
Check that the exec securebits survive creating a user namespace with
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and joining one with setns():
- both bits with their locks, which can't be changed in there
- both bits without their locks, which can still be cleared in there
- only the locks, which keep the bits from being set in there
The other securebits are reset as before.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
index f2397e75aa7c..5753c657808e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/check-exec.c
@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
* Author: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
*/
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* Defines AT_EXECVE_CHECK without type conflicts. */
@@ -460,4 +463,84 @@ TEST_F(secbits, restrict_locked_unset)
CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, test_secbits_set(0)));
}
+static const unsigned int exec_bits = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE;
+static const unsigned int exec_locks = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+
+/*
+ * Checks that the exec securebits in @exec survive creating and joining a user
+ * namespace, and that in there they can be changed exactly when they are not
+ * locked.
+ */
+static void test_userns(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const unsigned int exec)
+{
+ const int error = (exec & exec_locks) ? EPERM : 0;
+ int ready[2], done[2], userns_fd, status;
+ char path[64], c = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ /* A user namespace owned by us to join later. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(ready));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(done));
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, pid);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ close(ready[0]);
+ close(done[1]);
+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER))
+ _exit(1);
+ if (write(ready[1], &c, 1) != 1)
+ _exit(1);
+ if (read(done[0], &c, 1) < 0)
+ _exit(1);
+ _exit(0);
+ }
+ close(ready[1]);
+ close(done[0]);
+ if (read(ready[0], &c, 1) != 1) {
+ waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+ SKIP(return, "Cannot create a user namespace");
+ }
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/ns/user", pid);
+ userns_fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, userns_fd);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_secbits_set(prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) | exec));
+
+ /* Creating a user namespace keeps them... */
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER));
+ EXPECT_EQ(exec, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+ EXPECT_EQ(error, test_secbits_set(exec ^ exec_bits));
+ EXPECT_EQ(error, test_secbits_set(0)));
+
+ /* ...and so does joining one. */
+ CHILD(EXPECT_EQ(0, setns(userns_fd, CLONE_NEWUSER));
+ EXPECT_EQ(exec, prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS));
+ EXPECT_EQ(error, test_secbits_set(exec ^ exec_bits));
+ EXPECT_EQ(error, test_secbits_set(0)));
+
+ close(userns_fd);
+ close(done[1]);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pid, waitpid(pid, &status, 0));
+ close(ready[0]);
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, userns_locked)
+{
+ test_userns(_metadata, exec_bits | exec_locks);
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, userns_unlocked)
+{
+ test_userns(_metadata, exec_bits);
+}
+
+TEST_F(secbits, userns_lock_only)
+{
+ test_userns(_metadata, exec_locks);
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 20:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 20:53 [PATCH 0/2] userns: keep the exec securebits Christian Brauner
2026-10-26 20:53 ` [PATCH 1/2] userns: don't drop " Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 11:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-26 20:53 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
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