All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,rioo.tsukatsukii@gmail.com,pmladek@suse.com,
	brads@mainlining.org,nickolai@csail.mit.edu,akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: + panic-zero-the-dynamically-allocated-taint-buffer.patch added to mm-nonmm-unstable branch
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:35:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261026213504.6CE481F01825@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)


The patch titled
     Subject: panic: zero the dynamically allocated taint buffer
has been added to the -mm mm-nonmm-unstable branch.  Its filename is
     panic-zero-the-dynamically-allocated-taint-buffer.patch

This patch will shortly appear at
     https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches/panic-zero-the-dynamically-allocated-taint-buffer.patch

This patch will later appear in the mm-nonmm-unstable branch at
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
   a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
   b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
   c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
      reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's

*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***

The -mm tree is included into linux-next via various
branches at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there most days

------------------------------------------------------
From: Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
Subject: panic: zero the dynamically allocated taint buffer
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 22:01:52 -0400

A %s read of print_tainted()'s string can run past the end of the taint
buffer while another CPU rebuilds a longer string in it, reading slab
memory out of bounds into the kernel log (a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds
report at taint_buf + size).  A warning or an unhandled-signal dump on
another CPU reaches print_tainted() through dump_stack_print_info().

alloc_taint_buf() sizes the buffer for the longest taint string and
allocates it with kmalloc(), so the bytes past that string are never
written and the object holds no permanent NUL terminator. 
_print_tainted() rebuilds the string in place without locking and writes
the terminator last, so a reader that overtakes a writer extending the
string past the previous high-water mark finds no terminator inside the
object and walks off its end.  print_tainted()'s kernel-doc promises the
string is "always NULL terminated", a guarantee the previous zero-filled
static buffer kept.

Allocate the buffer with kzalloc() so its trailing bytes stay NUL and
every reader stops inside the object.

Reproduced on QEMU riscv64 under KASAN by growing the taint set while
processes took unhandled-signal dumps on several CPUs: the unpatched
kernel reports a slab-out-of-bounds read at taint_buf + size, the patched
one is clean.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20261024020153.830459-1-nickolai@csail.mit.edu
Fixes: a9dff0d0d11c ("kernel/panic: allocate taint string buffer dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Rio <rioo.tsukatsukii@gmail.com>
---

 kernel/panic.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/panic.c~panic-zero-the-dynamically-allocated-taint-buffer
+++ a/kernel/panic.c
@@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ static __init int alloc_taint_buf(void)
 
 	size += 1; /* For NULL terminator */
 
-	buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	if (!buf) {
 		panic("Failed to allocate taint string buffer");
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from nickolai@csail.mit.edu are

xarray-clear-the-new-heads-parent-before-freeing-the-old-head.patch
mm-vmalloc-read-vm_map_ram-block-regions-from-the-requested-offset.patch
panic-zero-the-dynamically-allocated-taint-buffer.patch


                 reply	other threads:[~2026-10-26 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261026213504.6CE481F01825@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=brads@mainlining.org \
    --cc=mm-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nickolai@csail.mit.edu \
    --cc=pmladek@suse.com \
    --cc=rioo.tsukatsukii@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.