From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793209848; b=c8TI8IKtMABFWW3DhOcWvaBLwZOKUWbL7+8vQuj+ZFMGhJIi5wG04CYtjbP8FOniWDzh nbiGkI29mnj2H6OXCESptkc5xq819lGVc41ghLIfAmSgk9A0VCUSbMerwwDXmDnsqCXdu nO7Nu5qnls5ZJNmTZ9fhsbuR7hFKr8+5mxN9254/3wgPOsjBQUzCPKr6QhzZ5Wche6Dbe +peho3Xqvl6bc1jtK3jfuQOrMLM2KxOOzfMlu/FbhXPC2eVericI+psLtk8inGhmhExpP 3fWv78fYc5jRLo422XMQSxQs40DKderXHrOqmv4olElA/HphN5DjJQ4RB1PqMI7dUrA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793209848; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=FbkobFeV3wUksuLwA7O4uOxTB76z8sF4d5y21mIYyoM=; b=WAqeSyxlGb6f3QN5yXC/f2HNFkTiidnmVkrgsa8zyhgBdGxTvg9jE9I6VhhZp4gU5hpc WE42wjma7Oz6J/lRhxzGk4RrF5U0mSpnWDrgsSR6E9akPbR15/YEJ7squkLUHhuhlUr+T S/kf+N04fySgj9J2O9NEfABgVcKLk/Et9l0YtQY30UeadXAXelIJdElJDK2rK2EijYMZN 6yKvd83aS8SA7pBEKAmeOupOXf+O/GLVBMAfqOvozKxhiKiZdfQaID1oFfvHucO2wR6Eh H38KVcP/QOvReQC9avigwsFMYdgWXVh3l2CcS5gjAXXlCjzz2eAE4tEADVLe2Y3PaHQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=DG+J1i+0; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CD63606A31A; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:50:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=DG+J1i+0 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9DD571F01825; Wed, 28 Oct 2026 17:50:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793209848; bh=FbkobFeV3wUksuLwA7O4uOxTB76z8sF4d5y21mIYyoM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=DG+J1i+0QV+tr9vldiEOg3l8p17vmyr1F85Xj1mK6eqYkiChQ7mz8tVFIQNU39/Mb OOuDvLB2WePKBArbSFX5VTyyaUlg1hjruBIDg8eqMG0GqkVXw3p+vhV9ME37nNP1et F+kFiqdfFY28FrNWkf41F8zaiGkgcCWNQ4drZmKU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Xiang Mei , Weiming Shi , Herbert Xu Subject: [PATCH 6.18 099/109] asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 18:01:23 +0100 Message-ID: <20261028165944.686564950@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261028165942.357251485@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261028165942.357251485@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Weiming Shi commit 9695df3b1db4ac4534274d38ee16e3b9b0bf910e upstream. The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING followed by add_key(). Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279) Call Trace: __key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884) key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021) __do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a valid trust anchor. Fixes: 3c58b2362ba8 ("KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Xiang Mei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260429181629.110802-2-bestswngs@gmail.com Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -240,10 +240,14 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct if (IS_ERR(key)) key = NULL; } else if (trusted->type == &key_type_asymmetric) { + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; const struct asymmetric_key_id **signer_ids; - signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **) - asymmetric_key_ids(trusted)->id; + kids = asymmetric_key_ids(trusted); + if (!kids) + return -ENOKEY; + + signer_ids = (const struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id; /* * The auth_ids come from the candidate key (the