From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: qemu-arm@nongnu.org, "Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>,
qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org,
qemu-riscv@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/28] hw/net: mark e1000, e1000e, IGB, rtl8139 & sPAPR VLAN as secure
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 13:12:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261029131241.2275706-8-berrange@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261029131241.2275706-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Historically most NICs are only interesting for non-virtualization
use cases and have not been written with malicious guests in mind.
As a general rule either virtio-net or xen-net should be used in
all virtualized guests requiring a security boundary.
There are a handful of exceptions resulting from historical usage
in the x86 world, to support virtualized guests lacking virtio
support.
Thus the rtl8139, e1000, e1000e & IGB NICs are declared to provide
a security boundary.
The PPC sPAPR Virtual LAN device is also marked secure.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
---
hw/net/e1000.c | 1 +
hw/net/e1000e.c | 1 +
hw/net/igb.c | 1 +
hw/net/rtl8139.c | 1 +
hw/net/spapr_llan.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/net/e1000.c b/hw/net/e1000.c
index 202ad404013..2f540dbb417 100644
--- a/hw/net/e1000.c
+++ b/hw/net/e1000.c
@@ -1759,6 +1759,7 @@ static void e1000_register_types(void)
type_info.parent = TYPE_E1000_BASE;
type_info.class_data = info;
type_info.class_init = e1000_class_init;
+ type_info.secure = true;
type_register_static(&type_info);
}
diff --git a/hw/net/e1000e.c b/hw/net/e1000e.c
index 9faf0c74c3d..96737ddb51a 100644
--- a/hw/net/e1000e.c
+++ b/hw/net/e1000e.c
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static const TypeInfo e1000e_info = {
.instance_size = sizeof(E1000EState),
.class_init = e1000e_class_init,
.instance_init = e1000e_instance_init,
+ .secure = true,
.interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
{ INTERFACE_PCIE_DEVICE },
{ }
diff --git a/hw/net/igb.c b/hw/net/igb.c
index c076807e711..0bd03efea0c 100644
--- a/hw/net/igb.c
+++ b/hw/net/igb.c
@@ -635,6 +635,7 @@ static const TypeInfo igb_info = {
.instance_size = sizeof(IGBState),
.class_init = igb_class_init,
.instance_init = igb_instance_init,
+ .secure = true,
.interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
{ INTERFACE_PCIE_DEVICE },
{ }
diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
index 16479284eea..38bc16f312f 100644
--- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
@@ -3450,6 +3450,7 @@ static const TypeInfo rtl8139_info = {
.instance_size = sizeof(RTL8139State),
.class_init = rtl8139_class_init,
.instance_init = rtl8139_instance_init,
+ .secure = true,
.interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
{ INTERFACE_CONVENTIONAL_PCI_DEVICE },
{ },
diff --git a/hw/net/spapr_llan.c b/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
index a5b8906849c..784e46f57d4 100644
--- a/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
+++ b/hw/net/spapr_llan.c
@@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ static const TypeInfo spapr_vlan_info = {
.class_init = spapr_vlan_class_init,
.instance_init = spapr_vlan_instance_init,
.instance_finalize = spapr_vlan_instance_finalize,
+ .secure = true,
};
static void spapr_vlan_register_types(void)
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-29 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-29 13:12 [PATCH v2 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 01/28] hw: mark all virtio PCI devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 02/28] hw: mark all virtio CCW " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 03/28] hw: mark all vhost devices a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 04/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 05/28] hw/vfio: mark all VFIO object classes " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 06/28] hw/xen: mark all Xen related object types as being secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 08/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 09/28] hw/watchdog: mark some watchdog devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 10/28] hw/scsi: mark spapr SCSI controller " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 11/28] hw/scsi: mark SCSI disk endpoint devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 12/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 13/28] hw: define most common PCI types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 14/28] hw/pci-host: mark common x86, ppc, arm and s390 PCI hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 15/28] hw/display: mark bochs, ramfb and VGA " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 16/28] hw/tpm: mark all TPM implementations " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 17/28] hw/misc: mark pvpanic, vmcoreinfo " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 18/28] hw/audio: mark Intel HDA devices & codecs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 19/28] hw/char: mark common serial / console devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 20/28] hw/mem: mark nvdimm, pc-dimm & spapr-nvdimm " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 21/28] hw/uefi: mark the EFI vars service " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 22/28] hw/acpi: mark erst, vmclock and vmgenid devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 23/28] hw: mark KVM clock and RTC " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 24/28] hw: device AMD, Intel and ARM IOMMUs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 25/28] hw/input: mark PS/2 and PC Keyboard devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 26/28] hw/i386: mark vmmouse / vmport " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 27/28] hw/display: mark cirrus and QXL " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 28/28] hw/usb: mark UHCI, OCHI & ECHI USB hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
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