From: "Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, imbrenda@linux.ibm.com,
"Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT
AND 64-BIT))
Subject: [RFC PATCH 4/4] KVM: x86/mmu: don't zap the secondary MMU on permission upgrade
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 15:33:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261029143336.390231-7-clopez@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261029143336.390231-3-clopez@suse.de>
When an mmu_notifier invalidation only upgrades permissions
(MMU_NOTIFIER_RANGE_PERM_UPGRADE), keep the existing SPTEs instead of
zapping them. The PFN is unchanged and no access is revoked, so a held
SPTE is at most as permissive as before. Permissions for the SPTE are
updated on the next fault, so dropping them early gains nothing.
The motivating case is a userfaultfd-wp dirty tracker such as QEMU's
background snapshot, which unprotects every guest page as it saves it.
Zapping on each unprotect makes the guest refault its whole working
set. On a 64GB guest under a background snapshot, a read-mostly workload
drops secondary-MMU refaults from ~1M/s to ~2.5K/s and cross-vCPU TLB
shootdowns from ~1400/s to near zero. Uses of mprotect() that only add
access benefit likewise.
Signed-off-by: Carlos López <clopez@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index dc2aef72ffdd..a4258a8c0c89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -1719,6 +1719,13 @@ bool kvm_unmap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
lockdep_assert_once(kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress ||
lockdep_is_held(&kvm->slots_lock));
+ /*
+ * Do not bother zapping SPTEs if this is only a protection upgrade.
+ * Permissions will be faulted-in on demand.
+ */
+ if (range->perm_upgrade)
+ return false;
+
if (kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
flush = __kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, range->slot,
range->start, range->end,
--
2.51.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-29 14:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-29 14:33 [RFC PATCH 0/4] KVM: x86/mmu: don't zap secondary MMU on permission upgrade Carlos López
2026-10-29 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] mm/mprotect: add MM_CP_PERM_UPGRADE Carlos López
2026-10-30 14:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] mm/mmu_notifier: add MMU_NOTIFIER_RANGE_PERM_UPGRADE Carlos López
2026-10-30 14:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] KVM: plumb MMU_NOTIFIER_RANGE_PERM_UPGRADE into kvm_gfn_range Carlos López
2026-10-30 14:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 14:33 ` Carlos López [this message]
2026-10-30 14:44 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] KVM: x86/mmu: don't zap the secondary MMU on permission upgrade sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 16:52 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] KVM: x86/mmu: don't zap " Claudio Imbrenda
2026-10-30 11:11 ` Carlos López
2026-10-30 12:39 ` Claudio Imbrenda
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