From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1793827187; b=eBMV8YV9AkA2lTBNfXmMidmSOXpnip/KmfeNcrOYSJwuktpBPING+lkwKGDvv3IrwNxR 0G9eVnHvpFYs/6PmKm4eQQjtdIWx+N0GVPy5W/5OC27upienea6siRB+vnJWoXS2pGSth xLUbS8pIxJkWKUsoa6JdGVJL6LTt5fpUwMY+VQxRKZg6uLVdAi7yfUapES+aXKCyT0BtF XuDo/eVnZt1d11Hle7UftcHmCnRmO2xARcbtG/Bb++woAfdU9BX0n/5t5v4EhDWwFE2A5 EmvfjYq/vMGRPgUNkiBmyr3qlEVCwYGrp0dvOVB7VxF0eMQrK2bAQTKmXWPDmiO8kLQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1793827187; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=Vq6UjmxsuEDIj7h4HT9ztsgHXpjpZmu9B9qxt6FZWfU=; b=iFRR11P6K7laOvZ33lhCmaPM2km36QVmPYhSbw5F0y8CwLmWt+jNXWBa+98QXIRgYpVV vh4J/cPQVxhFsdTEpoO3idTUbve1bU0JGg8sSsy3wpEAEE3vYe47MGRSSTzEAAxoh+Gsl DEVw9qOKHATZdM2HqOP7oRj+uCsNKpRUyGMcD98jf6n++rNA9CnKtLiLyO+6zua+r2gWg UroX1YQI+MDbPANnBv1biO76NbjYMqoaq86Bkuq7JmbIvdX6jM+WpXuxmZnuM1fXnlrCg iekllVgf1KdJWDTkoRDnLIG1BZTFFp2TLj5rcV4iaJrhK8+HbygZMhmzBiUoGJYB/Pw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=Cf+QWTL0; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 16CF8606A846; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 21:19:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key, unprotected) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=Cf+QWTL0 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 91D8F1F000C1; Wed, 4 Nov 2026 21:19:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1793827186; bh=Vq6UjmxsuEDIj7h4HT9ztsgHXpjpZmu9B9qxt6FZWfU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Cf+QWTL0AweKoIuyyiHtl/nNaKLNaE5nuxPbrnC1UDiT5LgM+B3ZRnuhKCpHG7l3C HKV78fUb5UkekUfGvJ8ug9u1LBiViORYO74P1anEogHjQl2Gp5WS1B1SkSGY28Ch+k laE90lsMcY0/mCV+vHXKE2VZjfyd5cVAcZdhz+CQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Tianchu Chen Subject: [PATCH 7.3 246/547] staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 16:07:10 -0500 Message-ID: <20261104211045.162855804@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261104211038.406938024@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261104211038.406938024@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.3-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tianchu Chen commit 495cb31c791bdf3f9efef255a9587b05b0526c9d upstream. The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a malicious AP in two ways: 1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len; and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8; for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len). A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le() length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV; this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the unconditional iv[3] access within the frame. 2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Assisted-by: LLM Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8ee3bdd1c45034200cb1aa9a7e9b575b9584643a@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_recv.c @@ -426,8 +426,21 @@ static union recv_frame *decryptor(struc u32 res = _SUCCESS; if (prxattrib->encrypt > 0) { - u8 *iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; + u8 *iv; + u32 min_len = prxattrib->hdrlen + prxattrib->iv_len + prxattrib->icv_len; + /* TKIP appends an 8-byte Michael MIC that icv_len doesn't account for */ + if (prxattrib->encrypt == _TKIP_) + min_len += 8; + + /* a protected frame must be long enough to hold the IV and ICV/MIC */ + if (precv_frame->u.hdr.len < min_len) { + rtw_free_recvframe(precv_frame, + &padapter->recvpriv.free_recv_queue); + return NULL; + } + + iv = precv_frame->u.hdr.rx_data + prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = (((iv[3]) >> 6) & 0x3); if (prxattrib->key_index > WEP_KEYS) { @@ -1395,6 +1408,10 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(s if (!mgmt_DATA) goto validate_80211w_fail; precv_frame = decryptor(adapter, precv_frame); + if (!precv_frame) { + kfree(mgmt_DATA); + goto validate_80211w_fail; + } /* save actual management data frame body */ memcpy(mgmt_DATA, ptr + pattrib->hdrlen + pattrib->iv_len, data_len); /* overwrite the iv field */ @@ -1402,8 +1419,6 @@ static signed int validate_80211w_mgmt(s /* remove the iv and icv length */ pattrib->pkt_len = pattrib->pkt_len - pattrib->iv_len - pattrib->icv_len; kfree(mgmt_DATA); - if (!precv_frame) - goto validate_80211w_fail; } else if (is_multicast_ether_addr(GetAddr1Ptr(ptr)) && (subtype == WIFI_DEAUTH || subtype == WIFI_DISASSOC)) { signed int BIP_ret = _SUCCESS;