From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>,
Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>,
Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>,
Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@oss.qualcomm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Synchronize session lifetime
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 06:02:36 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261112040242.247168-8-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261112040242.247168-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
The parent TEE device can remove the client device while live instances
keep trusted.ko loaded.
Guard session context state with a mutex, publish pvt_data.dev before
registering key_type_trusted and sanitize pvt_data on probe failure and
removal.
When an active TEE has not been bound, reject seal, unseal and get_random
with -ENODEV.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Fixes: 0a95ebc91305 ("KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys")
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
index 6e465c8bef5e..ad9c7baddcef 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ struct trusted_key_tee_private {
};
static struct trusted_key_tee_private pvt_data;
+/* Do not hold this mutex across key type registration or unregistration. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(trusted_key_tee_mutex);
/*
* Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
@@ -67,6 +70,12 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
struct tee_param param[4];
struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
+ if (!pvt_data.ctx) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
@@ -74,7 +83,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ goto out_unlock;
}
inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL;
@@ -100,7 +110,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
}
tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
-
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -114,6 +125,12 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
struct tee_param param[4];
struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
+ if (!pvt_data.ctx) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
@@ -121,7 +138,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ goto out_unlock;
}
inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL;
@@ -147,7 +165,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
}
tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
-
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -161,13 +180,20 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
struct tee_param param[4];
struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
+ if (!pvt_data.ctx) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len);
if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
- return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
+ goto out_unlock;
}
inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM;
@@ -189,7 +215,8 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
}
tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
-
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -205,50 +232,67 @@ static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data)
static int trusted_key_probe(struct tee_client_device *rng_device)
{
struct device *dev = &rng_device->dev;
+ struct tee_context *ctx;
int ret;
struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg;
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
+ if (pvt_data.ctx) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg));
- pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL,
- NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx))
- return -ENODEV;
+ ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN);
sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL;
sess_arg.num_params = 0;
- ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL);
+ ret = tee_client_open_session(ctx, &sess_arg, NULL);
if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) {
dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n",
sess_arg.ret);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_ctx;
}
+ pvt_data.ctx = ctx;
pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session;
-
- ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_sess;
-
pvt_data.dev = dev;
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
- return 0;
+ ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
-out_sess:
- tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
+ tee_client_close_session(ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
out_ctx:
- tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
-
+ tee_client_close_context(ctx);
+ pvt_data.ctx = NULL;
+ pvt_data.dev = NULL;
+ pvt_data.session_id = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
return ret;
}
static void trusted_key_remove(struct tee_client_device *dev)
{
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+
+ mutex_lock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id);
tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx);
+ pvt_data.ctx = NULL;
+ pvt_data.dev = NULL;
+ pvt_data.session_id = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&trusted_key_tee_mutex);
}
static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = {
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-12 4:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-12 4:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] KEYS: Sanitize the garbage collector Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] KEYS: Add key_gc_flush() for draining RCU callbacks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] dns_resolver: Move the key type into a separate module Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] NFSv4: Clear idmap keyring cache when the last client unloads Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] smb: client: Clear idmap/SPNEGO caches when the last session is unloaded Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] s390/cert_store: Start tracking subsystem keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] KEYS: trusted: Update static calls before init Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-12 4:31 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Synchronize session lifetime sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] KEYS: trusted: TEE: Disable sysfs bind attributes Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] rxrpc: Release conn->key when init_connection_security() fails Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] rxrpc: Move key types to their own module Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] KEYS: Pin the backing kernel module for a key type Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] KEYS: Remove key_type_dead Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 4:02 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-12 4:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-12 8:11 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] KEYS: Sanitize the garbage collector Jarkko Sakkinen
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