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From: Prasanth R <ragaprasanth@gmail.com>
To: u-boot@lists.denx.de
Cc: jerome.forissier@arm.com, trini@konsulko.com,
	Prasanth R <ragaprasanth@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] net: tcp: fix CVE-2026-29007 and CVE-2026-29008
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:56:43 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117085645.3142669-1-ragaprasanth@gmail.com> (raw)

The legacy TCP stack trusts the data offset and the option lengths of
received segments. A segment whose data offset points past its end
makes tcp_parse_options() read beyond the packet (CVE-2026-29007) and
makes payload_len negative, which reaches memcpy() as a huge size in
TCP_SYN_SENT (CVE-2026-29008). Both were disclosed on this list by
VulnCheck in May; as far as I can see they are not fixed yet.

Patch 1 drops segments whose data offset does not fit. Patch 2 makes
tcp_parse_options() check each option against the option area, which
also fixes a read past the end when the last option byte is
TCP_O_END, and limits the window scale to 14.

Testing: ran tcp_parse_options() and the length handling from main
and from this series under AddressSanitizer with the malformed
segments. Main reads past the packet in all cases; with the series
the segments are dropped or the options ignored.
Also built sandbox on current main and ran ut cmd net_test_wget: no
failures.

I used an AI assistant (Claude) to help write and test these patches;
I reviewed the changes and the results.

Prasanth R (2):
  net: tcp: drop segments with an invalid data offset
  net: tcp: check option lengths in tcp_parse_options()

 net/tcp.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 13:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  8:56 Prasanth R [this message]
2026-11-17  8:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] net: tcp: drop segments with an invalid data offset Prasanth R
2026-11-17  8:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] net: tcp: check option lengths in tcp_parse_options() Prasanth R

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