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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99461: mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:25:59 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026111908-CVE-2026-99461-5ce5@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()

Patch series "mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF", v5.

The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry.  On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.

Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().


This patch (of 3):

When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.

That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn().  On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn.  On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page->flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.

So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.

And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last reference of folio.  The
trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file() is left with a dangling folio pointer.  so
using the folio_pfn() before dropping the reference, closing
use-after-free window.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99461 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit d41fd2016ed07a630da2817b76c98eeab7931e1e and fixed in 6.12.117 with commit 384c524e066459c91a8750a055fe70d56b334437
	Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit d41fd2016ed07a630da2817b76c98eeab7931e1e and fixed in 6.18.63 with commit c4252273ead984541eb9313667f2924f2ff8d0e0
	Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit d41fd2016ed07a630da2817b76c98eeab7931e1e and fixed in 7.3.2 with commit 9efc8d0c9c81094cfa99667154f5682d487e9b63
	Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit d41fd2016ed07a630da2817b76c98eeab7931e1e and fixed in 7.4-rc1 with commit 942c8ec27aa4ffc587511650718349964e1696e6

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99461
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	include/trace/events/huge_memory.h
	mm/khugepaged.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/384c524e066459c91a8750a055fe70d56b334437
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4252273ead984541eb9313667f2924f2ff8d0e0
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9efc8d0c9c81094cfa99667154f5682d487e9b63
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/942c8ec27aa4ffc587511650718349964e1696e6

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 14:59 UTC|newest]

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