All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99473: KVM: guest_memfd: Gracefully handle xarray errors when binding a memslot
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:26:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026111911-CVE-2026-99473-e2da@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: guest_memfd: Gracefully handle xarray errors when binding a memslot

If inserting a memslot into a guest_memfd's bindings xarray fails,
propagate the error back to the caller, i.e. fail memslot creation as well.
Signalling success and continuing on with memslot creation results in
use-after-free, as the guest_memfd instance will remain reachable via the
memslot after the file is freed (kvm_gmem_release() won't nullify the file
pointer due to lack of a valid binding).

Opportunistically WARN and reject binding if KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY is
already set, partly to guard against goofs elsewhere, but mostly so that
KVM doesn't need to worry about clobbering flags when unwinding on failure.

Regarding the unwind, the slot must be fully prepared before inserting it
into the bindings, at which point the slot becomes reachable.  I.e. waiting
to update the slot in order to avoid the ugly unwind isn't an option.  And
as part of the unwind, explicitly nullify the relevant bindings, as xarray
can store a subset of entries when populating a range.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99473 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.8 with commit a7800aa80ea4d5356b8474c2302812e9d4926fa6 and fixed in 6.12.117 with commit 2cfc1ccf67ffe96811c816d27d44128c5d5833ec
	Issue introduced in 6.8 with commit a7800aa80ea4d5356b8474c2302812e9d4926fa6 and fixed in 6.18.63 with commit 1706461eb1af814366b6d0ab413edd0876bd8033
	Issue introduced in 6.8 with commit a7800aa80ea4d5356b8474c2302812e9d4926fa6 and fixed in 7.3.2 with commit 2fa83c615f8dbb240b262265e788b120b6384e7b
	Issue introduced in 6.8 with commit a7800aa80ea4d5356b8474c2302812e9d4926fa6 and fixed in 7.4-rc1 with commit e6ecb88711d93b9e014532f17d3d29b57e80932c

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99473
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cfc1ccf67ffe96811c816d27d44128c5d5833ec
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1706461eb1af814366b6d0ab413edd0876bd8033
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2fa83c615f8dbb240b262265e788b120b6384e7b
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6ecb88711d93b9e014532f17d3d29b57e80932c

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 14:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2026111911-CVE-2026-99473-e2da@gregkh \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.