From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
cve@kernel.org,
"io-uring@vger.kernel.org" <io-uring@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: proposed io_uring CVEs for 7.3.2
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:55:37 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119235537.1684133-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <535342d8-604f-45dd-968a-0fac8223acbc@kernel.dk>
I agree with most of the other assessments you made. I'll try to improve the
review process on my end to address those.
The one outlier:
On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 10:39:40AM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote:
>> 0b34e7b20a48 io_uring: charge tctx nodes and personalities
>
>Doubtful, unless we're strict on memcg violations are a CVE, as I'm
>sure there are tons of ways to do that right now in a bunch of
>kernel code.
We are. We might have plenty of those, yes, but it falls under the definition
of vulnerability that cve.org has.
We've assigned these before when an unprivileged user can pin kernel
memory outside of memcg, e.g. CVE-2026-43287 for drm property blobs and
CVE-2026-90099 for tc filters. Here every thread gets an uncharged entry per
ring it has used, and the changelog example has 642 threads on 4000 rings
holding 2.3GB with 59MB charged against a 64MB memory.max.
>> 075d5837bafc io_uring/rsrc: charge buffer arrays and nodes to memcg
>
>Same as above.
Same as above :)
The other ones do make sense to reject.
--
Thanks,
Sasha
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 23:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-13 23:22 Subject: io_uring/eventfd: registered eventfd signals only once after the cd305ee3633a backport (6.18.y, 6.12.y, Ubuntu 26.04) dev
2026-11-14 2:00 ` Greg KH
2026-11-15 1:13 ` dev
2026-11-14 17:42 ` Sasha Levin
2026-11-14 18:12 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-16 9:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-17 2:21 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-17 7:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-17 12:41 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-19 14:19 ` proposed io_uring CVEs for 7.3.2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-19 15:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-19 17:40 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-19 23:54 ` Sasha Levin
2026-11-20 6:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-19 17:39 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-19 23:55 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-11-20 7:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-17 12:42 ` io_uring/eventfd: registered eventfd signals only once after the cd305ee3633a backport (6.18.y, 6.12.y, Ubuntu 26.04) Sasha Levin
2026-11-17 12:45 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-17 12:59 ` Sasha Levin
2026-11-19 18:10 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-19 20:39 ` Sasha Levin
2026-11-19 23:25 ` Jens Axboe
2026-11-20 5:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-20 20:39 ` Sasha Levin
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