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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99350: rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:24:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026111947-CVE-2026-99350-a67e@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock

Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it
returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if
a wait was interrupted by a signal.  This would allow a parallel sendmsg()
to race.

Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held,
and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether
it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the
lock if it's still held.

Fix this by:

 (1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and
     get rid of the indicator parameter.  This makes it easier to see where
     the lock is held.

 (2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted,
     just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock

 (3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving
     ->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer.

Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space
failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call
user_mutex.  The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any
error at a second attempt.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99350 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit b0f571ecd7943423c25947439045f0d352ca3dbf and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit 35f7a69391ca0819d04ca6db3c2355848d633e16
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit b0f571ecd7943423c25947439045f0d352ca3dbf and fixed in 6.18.61 with commit 965456110cf6952cc4eec80761171503e6e424df
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit b0f571ecd7943423c25947439045f0d352ca3dbf and fixed in 7.3.2 with commit ec98e8bdbde85e2dd2d43570e25b52bdfac1735b
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit b0f571ecd7943423c25947439045f0d352ca3dbf and fixed in 7.4-rc1 with commit 7801c42c3bb737cfb06194a383873fcad8daacf5
	Issue introduced in 5.10.140 with commit 79e2ca7aa96e80961828ab6312264633b66183cc
	Issue introduced in 5.15.64 with commit 2bc769b8edb158be7379d15f36e23d66cf850053
	Issue introduced in 5.19.6 with commit 091dc91e119fdd61432347231724f4e861c6b465

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99350
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35f7a69391ca0819d04ca6db3c2355848d633e16
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/965456110cf6952cc4eec80761171503e6e424df
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec98e8bdbde85e2dd2d43570e25b52bdfac1735b
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7801c42c3bb737cfb06194a383873fcad8daacf5

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 14:34 UTC|newest]

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