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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99571: nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:49:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112015-CVE-2026-99571-e86e@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute

Reading the "address" sysfs attribute calls kernel_getsockname() on the
admin queue socket, which can race with the queue teardown during
connection error recovery: a reader can observe NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE set,
then block on the queue lock while nvme_tcp_free_queue() releases the
socket and clears queue->sock without holding the lock.  Once the
reader acquires the lock it dereferences the NULL socket pointer.

Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") had the queue liveness check inside the lock.
Commit 782373ba2766 ("nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue_lock lock
and destroy") moved it back out because the lock itself is destroyed
in nvme_tcp_free_queue(), so a reader arriving late trips
mutex_destroy().

Check the queue liveness inside the queue lock, and clear queue->sock
under the same lock.  The teardown clears NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE under the
lock well before the socket is released, so a reader either sees the
bit cleared or a socket that cannot be released while it holds the
lock.  To also close the lock lifetime race, the queue locks are now
owned by the controller: they are initialized with the queue array and
only destroyed when the controller is freed, which cannot happen while
a sysfs attribute read is still in progress.  The queue count is
computed by the NVME_TCP_OPT_NR_QUEUES() macro from the original
connect options for both initialization and destruction, as reconnects
may shrink ctrl->queue_count.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99571 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit 782373ba27660ba7d330208cf5509ece6feb4545 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 0af6a8aede3121bc9662111665294731daddb13a
	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit 782373ba27660ba7d330208cf5509ece6feb4545 and fixed in 7.4-rc1 with commit 2eeeaa9c1ff0c429096acc2947c296db6a56f96d
	Issue introduced in 6.1.118 with commit 4f946479b326a3cbb193f2b8368aed9269514c35
	Issue introduced in 6.6.62 with commit 975cb1d2121511584695d0e47fdb90e6782da007
	Issue introduced in 6.11.9 with commit e15cebc1b21856944b387f4abd03b66bd3d4f027

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99571
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0af6a8aede3121bc9662111665294731daddb13a
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2eeeaa9c1ff0c429096acc2947c296db6a56f96d

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  5:53 UTC|newest]

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