From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99735: mm/mglru: don't use stack pointers when walking PUD and PMD tables
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:52:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112015-CVE-2026-99735-21d2@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mglru: don't use stack pointers when walking PUD and PMD tables
MGLRU passes stack copies of page-table entries in walk_pud_range() and
walk_pmd_range() when walking to the next level. These copies can become
stale when khugepaged or MADV_DONTNEED (CONFIG_PT_RECLAIM) removes a PTE
table concurrently.
This pattern dates back to commit bd74fdaea146 ("mm: multi-gen LRU:
support page table walks"). Likely, earlier locking masked the latent
bug. Later changes exposed it: commit 1d65b771bc08 ("mm/khugepaged:
retract_page_tables() without mmap or vma lock") allowed concurrent
retraction, and commit cf4a65539c13 ("memcg-v1: no need for memcg locking
for MGLRU") dropped the walker's outer RCU protection.
The fix is simple, so just fix the original commit so we don't have to
speculate. To fix it, pass the actual PMD/PUD pointers. This restores the
RCU-protected lookup and validation against the live PMD. Note that the PUD
handling is required as well to handle folded page tables correctly in all
cases.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: handle walk_pud_range() as well, clarify+simplify description,
adjust Fixes: ]
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99735 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bd74fdaea146029e4fa12c6de89adbe0779348a9 and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit a352391f8f9c035d3b2a8a9fe6e3fd2e1c4ec44e
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bd74fdaea146029e4fa12c6de89adbe0779348a9 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit 4b428d9d24e303f92819119c66858f5de38bbc78
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bd74fdaea146029e4fa12c6de89adbe0779348a9 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 4e5eb180d37cb222ed3c9b6772c6044e16c2a1c3
Issue introduced in 6.1 with commit bd74fdaea146029e4fa12c6de89adbe0779348a9 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit 65a9bf08a3e4d6e58df211ed900c16bafb79b267
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99735
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
mm/vmscan.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a352391f8f9c035d3b2a8a9fe6e3fd2e1c4ec44e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b428d9d24e303f92819119c66858f5de38bbc78
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e5eb180d37cb222ed3c9b6772c6044e16c2a1c3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65a9bf08a3e4d6e58df211ed900c16bafb79b267
reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 6:00 UTC|newest]
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