From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99745: x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:52:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112019-CVE-2026-99745-dfcf@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/bugs: Select the BHI mitigation based on the attack vector properly
The BHI mitigation selection is inconsistent with the documentation
(attack_vector_controls.rst), which lists BHI under both the
user->kernel and guest->host attack vectors. bhi_select_mitigation()
only enables it when CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST is set; otherwise it
selects BHI_MITIGATION_OFF, even if CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL is set.
As a result, a kernel compiled with KVM disabled gets BHI automatically
disabled, since CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST defaults to off without KVM.
This is a bug, given that CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL still needs it: on
affected Intel CPUs these kernels lose BHI_DIS_S or the BHB clearing
loop by default. Booting with mitigations=auto,no_guest_host has the
same effect.
Select BHI_MITIGATION_ON whenever user->kernel is mitigated, and keep
BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY for the guest->host-only case.
[ bp: Clarify commit title. ]
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99745 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 6.17 with commit ddcd4d3cb37c8ad60cdbaaffe93f85e15e2babb5 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit f9f2a155078cf7b10dd8b1ffdacf0a3aeb8baeb5
Issue introduced in 6.17 with commit ddcd4d3cb37c8ad60cdbaaffe93f85e15e2babb5 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 5bc572befb2990cb2ad83ca447f64e6654a9889f
Issue introduced in 6.17 with commit ddcd4d3cb37c8ad60cdbaaffe93f85e15e2babb5 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit 3457b3bcd344005af894876cab4e634cabdcbb62
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99745
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9f2a155078cf7b10dd8b1ffdacf0a3aeb8baeb5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5bc572befb2990cb2ad83ca447f64e6654a9889f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3457b3bcd344005af894876cab4e634cabdcbb62
reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 6:00 UTC|newest]
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