From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, gustavoars@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org,
hca@linux.ibm.com, nathan@kernel.org, morbo@google.com,
justinstitt@google.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
riel@surriel.com, shakeel.butt@linux.dev, kernel-team@meta.com,
rkeilty@meta.com, atish.patra@linux.dev, dgreid@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/kstack_erase: Use REP STOSQ for large stack fills
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:44:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261120214415.060e8375@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <97e94491-ce19-45a1-8737-b30b49e997e8@linux.dev>
On Fri, 20 Nov 2026 18:46:01 +0000
Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev> wrote:
> On 20/11/2026 04:42, David Laight wrote:
> > On Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:38:25 +0000
> > David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Thu, 19 Nov 2026 14:28:04 -0800
> >> Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 1:32 PM Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> With KSTACK_ERASE, every return to user space poisons the part of the
> >>>> task stack that was used since the previous return. The generic
> >>>> __stackleak_poison() does that one word per loop iteration, so a syscall
> >>>> that went 1-2 KiB deep pays for 128-256 separate stores. On Meta hosts
> >>>> running many small VMs, stackleak_erase() accounts for about 1.5% of
> >>>> non-idle host kernel cycles.
> >>>>
> >>>> Override __stackleak_poison() on x86-64, as s390 already does, through
> >>>> the hook added by commit 491a78663e03 ("stackleak: allow to specify arch
> >>>> specific stackleak poison function"). Fill spans larger than 512 bytes
> >>>> with REP STOSQ and keep the word loop for shorter ones, where the fixed
> >>>> startup cost of REP STOSQ does not pay off. REP STOSQ starts to win at
> >>>> about 300-400 bytes on Zen 5c and Cooper Lake, so on both no span gets
> >>>> slower.
> >>>>
> >>>> The fill is inline asm, so the noinstr function still makes no calls.
> >>>> memset64() would be the same instruction, but it is only static inline,
> >>>> and with KMSAN it is an out-of-line function.
> >>>>
> >>>> In a Zen 5c KVM guest, stackleak_erase() got about 35% cheaper per return
> >>>> to user space (71 ns to 46 ns, scan included) over a futex, epoll, procfs
> >>>> and Unix socket syscall mix. Same-vCPU futex wake/wait and Unix socket
> >>>> sendmsg()/recvmsg() ping-pong round trips got 5-8% faster.
> >>>>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
> >>>> ---
> >>>> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
> >>>>
> >>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> >>>> index 77488ff5eb8c7c..049231d484ad0e 100644
> >>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> >>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> >>>> @@ -580,6 +580,31 @@ static __always_inline bool on_thread_stack(void)
> >>>> current_stack_pointer) < THREAD_SIZE;
> >>>> }
> >>>>
> >>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> >>>> +#define __stackleak_poison __stackleak_poison
> >>>> +static __always_inline void __stackleak_poison(unsigned long erase_low,
> >>>> + unsigned long erase_high,
> >>>> + unsigned long poison)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + unsigned long count;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + /* Short spans do not amortize the startup cost of REP STOSQ. */
> >>>> + if (erase_high <= erase_low + 512) {
> >>>> + while (erase_low < erase_high) {
> >>>> + *(unsigned long *)erase_low = poison;
> >>>> + erase_low += sizeof(unsigned long);
> >>>> + }
> >>>> + return;
> >>
> >> gcc 13 onwards makes a meal of that - https://godbolt.org/z/KPP4h8xz6
> >> It does manage to unroll the loop once - which is good because the intel
> >> cpu (I've got) won't execute a 'one clock loop' (the zen5 will); but the
> >> setup code is horrid.
> >> But I also think some of the more recent cpu can execute more than
> >> one write per clock.
> >> If you unroll the loop 4 times it may run a lot faster.
> >> Perhaps:
> >> long count = (erase_high - erase_low) / sizeof(unsigned long);
> >> if (count <= 64) {
> >> while ((count -= 4) >= 0) {
> >> *(unsigned long *)erase_low = poison;
> >> *(unsigned long *)(erase_low + 8) = poison;
> >
> > The add (probably) needs to be in the middle...
> > erase_low += 32;
> >> *(unsigned long *)(erase_low - 32 + 16) = poison;
> >> *(unsigned long *)(erase_low - 32 + 24) = poison;
> >> }
> >> if (count & 2) {
> >> *(unsigned long *)erase_low = poison;
> >> *(unsigned long *)(erase_low + 8) = poison;
> >> erase_low += 16;
> >> }
> >> if (count & 1)
> >> *(unsigned long *)erase_low = poison;
> >> } else {
> >> ...
> >> }
> >>
> >> Except that gcc makes a mess of it again.
> >> I don't think the 'erase_low += 32' is going to execute at the
> >> same time as the last (two probably) writes so costs a clock.
> >> So it may need to be asm.
> >
> > I threw in enough OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() to stop the optimiser breaking
> > the code. https://godbolt.org/z/nx477T4M1
> > gcc then generates:
> > movq %rdx, (%rdi)
> > movq %rdx, 8(%rdi)
> > addq $32, %rdi
> > movq %rdx, -16(%rdi)
> > movq %rdx, -8(%rdi)
> > .L32:
> > subq $4, %rcx
> > jns .L22
> > for the code loop (clang is a bit worse - but should be ok).
> > I think that will be a 'two clock loop' on cpu that can do
> > two writes/clock; zen3 and ice lake).
> > For 'stack splatting' rounding up to a multiple of 32 bytes
> > will save all the 'remainder' code.
>
>
> The range can't be rounded: erase_low is wherever the poison search
> stopped, and erase_high is the stack pointer or the bottom of pt_regs
> (168 bytes, so only 8-byte aligned). Rounding up writes live stack,
> rounding down can write STACK_END_MAGIC when the stack was used to the
> end.
If the stack down by STACK_END_MAGIC has been written you are almost in
'deep do-do land' so task_low_bound() could return an aligned address
and that would let you align down the low address.
(So leaving the very last few words alone.)
It also probably doesn't really matter about the top few words.
So the length could be rounded down.
Alternatively, do STACK_END_MAGIC and STACK_ERASE_POISON even need
to have different values?
(And aren't stacks now allocated with a guard page - so you get a
fault on overflow much earlier than any check for STACK_END_MAGIC.)
But does this code even work in a useful manner.
It seems to stop scanning after finding 128 bytes of KSTACK_ERASE_POISON.
Isn't that going to stop on a function with a large on-stack buffer
(especially since one is likely to be on the deepest part of the stack).
I'd have thought you'd jump down the stack in larger lumps than that
just looking for an unwritten word before even trying to decide if it
was the boundary.
David
>
>
> >
> > David
> >
> >>
> >>>> + }
> >>>> +
> >>>> + count = (erase_high - erase_low) / sizeof(unsigned long);
> >>>> + asm volatile("rep stosq"
> >>>> + : "+D" (erase_low), "+c" (count)
> >>>> + : "a" (poison)
> >>>> + : "memory");
> >>>
> >>> Surely this isn't the only place using `rep stosq` in the tree, right?
> >>> It's not, see memset64 in arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h.
> >>
> >> Which seems to have very few users.
> >> memset_p() and memset_l() have almost no users.
> >>
> >> David
> >>
> >>>
> >>>> +}
> >>>> +#endif
> >>>> +
> >>>> #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL
> >>>> #include <asm/paravirt.h>
> >>>> #else
> >>>> --
> >>>> 2.53.1-Meta
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 21:31 [PATCH 0/2] x86/kstack_erase: Faster stack poisoning, plus a startup build fix Usama Arif
2026-11-19 21:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/boot/startup: Disable kernel stack depth tracking Usama Arif
2026-11-19 22:30 ` Nick Desaulniers
2026-11-19 21:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/kstack_erase: Use REP STOSQ for large stack fills Usama Arif
2026-11-19 22:28 ` Nick Desaulniers
2026-11-20 11:38 ` David Laight
2026-11-20 12:42 ` David Laight
2026-11-20 18:46 ` Usama Arif
2026-11-20 21:44 ` David Laight [this message]
2026-11-20 10:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-11-20 12:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-11-20 18:43 ` Usama Arif
2026-11-20 14:02 ` David Laight
2026-11-20 15:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-11-20 16:18 ` David Laight
2026-11-20 18:55 ` David Laight
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