From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99601: udf: check the unallocated space table when it is loaded
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:49:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112026-CVE-2026-99601-4a4e@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: check the unallocated space table when it is loaded
udf_table_new_block() hands out the first block of the extent closest
to its goal and trusts that the extent covers at least one whole block
inside the partition. Nothing checks that. A zero-length extent makes
it return the block the extent points at, which need not be free, and
the subtraction of one block then underflows the length into the type
bits, turning the entry into a bogus continuation. An extent running
past the end of the partition makes it return blocks behind the
partition.
Such tables are not only found on crafted images: until the previous
commit, udf_table_new_block() itself left zero-length extents behind
in tables written by mkudffs, and then converted them into extents
running past the partition.
Check every extent once when the table is loaded, and refuse
read-write access if one is empty, is not a whole number of blocks, or
does not lie inside the partition, in the same way as for other
allocation information the kernel cannot use. Check first that the
table is an Unallocated Space Entry at all: the walk starts at the
offset of the allocation descriptors in one, and for a file entry that
offset lies before the inode's in-memory copy of the descriptors.
Treat a chain of allocation extent descriptors that leads back to
itself the same way: the walk would otherwise return the same extents
forever, and the mount would never finish. Let a fatal signal
interrupt the walk and fail the mount.
Refusing read-write access to an empty extent is deliberate. It shows
that an old kernel took the last block but left the entry behind. If
consumed again, the entry returns an in-use block and turns into a huge
bogus extent. Refusing the table before that
happens avoids this second allocation; the filesystem can still be
mounted read-only. The check cannot detect every overlap that may
already exist in a damaged table.
This patch should be backported together with the previous one: that
patch stops creating new empty extents, and this one rejects existing
ones before they are consumed again.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99601 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit 9f3df19234d2c180b9a99b0d3c2472e8fade5043
Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit 88401035fbfcad7067793455326262ac30633586
Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 302eb1fa5be5e476a633d8ed0fd56ea5efa57374
Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit e614c3e35a6699ed691b4d17e1ec4230e34aa3eb
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99601
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
fs/udf/super.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f3df19234d2c180b9a99b0d3c2472e8fade5043
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88401035fbfcad7067793455326262ac30633586
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/302eb1fa5be5e476a633d8ed0fd56ea5efa57374
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e614c3e35a6699ed691b4d17e1ec4230e34aa3eb
reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 5:55 UTC|newest]
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