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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99783: net/9p/usbg: Fix use-after-free in disable_usb9pfs()
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:52:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112032-CVE-2026-99783-bd2c@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/9p/usbg: Fix use-after-free in disable_usb9pfs()

disable_usb9pfs() frees the IN and OUT usb_request objects before it
disables the corresponding endpoints. If either request is still queued,
the later usb_ep_disable() call cancels the endpoint queue and the UDC
driver can still access the already freed request.

With dummy_hcd and KASAN, this is reproducible by queueing the OUT
request and then disconnecting the configfs gadget:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dummy_disable+0x2b4/0x300
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009702400 by task sh/1
  usb_ep_disable+0x8e/0x1f0
  usb9pfs_func_unbind+0x193/0x350
  gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x135/0x280

dummy_free_request() also warns because the request is freed while its
queue entry is still linked.

Disable both endpoints before freeing the request objects. This lets
usb_ep_disable() cancel any queued transfers and invoke the completion
callback while the request storage is still valid. The request objects
are then freed only after they have been removed from the endpoint
queues.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99783 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit a3be076dc174d9022a71a12554feb4c97b5c4d5c and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit f71172094aeb997efc5dbd01d183db480b308d85
	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit a3be076dc174d9022a71a12554feb4c97b5c4d5c and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit e1c80ecafc65af4100e761844c8aa16be9554bd7
	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit a3be076dc174d9022a71a12554feb4c97b5c4d5c and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 197f886898325b191147e9015a47f969a2568838
	Issue introduced in 6.12 with commit a3be076dc174d9022a71a12554feb4c97b5c4d5c and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit 6f401e350939442b2ac905f7e5ac952e3802a5d8

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99783
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/9p/trans_usbg.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f71172094aeb997efc5dbd01d183db480b308d85
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1c80ecafc65af4100e761844c8aa16be9554bd7
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/197f886898325b191147e9015a47f969a2568838
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f401e350939442b2ac905f7e5ac952e3802a5d8

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  6:02 UTC|newest]

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