From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99635: vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:50:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112038-CVE-2026-99635-af4e@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload
vhost_vsock_alloc_skb() sizes the skb from iov_length(), the total guest
descriptor length. virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() instead adds hdr->len to
rx_bytes and buf_used, and budgets each queued skb as SKB_TRUESIZE(0). The
guest controls the descriptor length and hdr->len independently.
A guest can therefore provide a 64 KiB descriptor while declaring a zero
payload. The descriptor-sized skb remains queued, rx_bytes and buf_used
remain unchanged, and only the fixed queue-entry budget limits retention.
This is not a lifetime leak: the skb is freed when dequeued or at socket
teardown. Repeating this across connections can nevertheless exhaust host
memory. On Linux v7.2, 455 such descriptors retained 30,255,680 bytes for
a 262,144-byte receive buffer; a full-payload control retained 265,984
bytes.
Vhost previously read hdr->len and allocated pkt->buf from that value. The
conversion from virtio_vsock_pkt to sk_buff instead allocated receive skbs
from the descriptor length, introducing the allocation-accounting mismatch.
Copy the header into a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating
the skb. Size the allocation as sizeof(hdr) + payload_len so descriptor
capacity no longer determines queued memory. Check payload_len against
len - sizeof(hdr) to avoid addition overflow on 32-bit hosts.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99635 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 6.3 with commit 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit 92ac18f7de67c7cb35b71e9872b08fb9ba9a6bf8
Issue introduced in 6.3 with commit 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit 89a2f2251a06751ddabbd6a39c207236b8bd42d5
Issue introduced in 6.3 with commit 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 9819add3aeb66dc823db0a82337f55481ad463be
Issue introduced in 6.3 with commit 71dc9ec9ac7d3eee785cdc986c3daeb821381e20 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit d5e912448cd98b261eba8e35ab838f2dc69a79f5
Issue introduced in 6.1.63 with commit baddcc2c71572968cdaeee1c4ab3dc0ad90fa765
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99635
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
drivers/vhost/vsock.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92ac18f7de67c7cb35b71e9872b08fb9ba9a6bf8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89a2f2251a06751ddabbd6a39c207236b8bd42d5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9819add3aeb66dc823db0a82337f55481ad463be
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5e912448cd98b261eba8e35ab838f2dc69a79f5
reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 5:56 UTC|newest]
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