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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99652: mm: fix deadlock of mremap() against UFFDIO_MOVE
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:50:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112044-CVE-2026-99652-d2d8@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: fix deadlock of mremap() against UFFDIO_MOVE

With per-VMA locks, UFFDIO_MOVE can run concurrently with mremap()
on different VMAs in the same mm. Those VMAs can share page tables, so
both operations can acquire the same pair of page-table locks.

UFFDIO_MOVE orders the locks by address, while mremap() takes the source
lock first. These conflicting orders can deadlock; mremap() holding
mmap_lock for writing no longer helps.

Move double_pt_lock() and double_pt_unlock() to mm/internal.h and use
them for all page-table moves in mremap(). Preserve the source entry
checks after acquiring both locks. Remove the comments claiming that
exclusive mmap_lock makes lock ordering irrelevant.

In move_ptes(), make sure to just recheck source and destination PMD
after taking the locks and drop the overly-long comment.

Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.

[ david: use new helpers consistently; simplify description and comments;
         move_ptes() fixup ]

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99652 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.9 with commit 867a43a34ff8a38772212045262b2c9b77807ea3 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 3627d4eaa7f4426b979d497544ce23cb8884134b
	Issue introduced in 6.9 with commit 867a43a34ff8a38772212045262b2c9b77807ea3 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit d03df42ddae196f20e9cfb775704e60269eb6b44

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99652
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
	mm/huge_memory.c
	mm/hugetlb.c
	mm/internal.h
	mm/mremap.c
	mm/userfaultfd.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3627d4eaa7f4426b979d497544ce23cb8884134b
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d03df42ddae196f20e9cfb775704e60269eb6b44

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  5:56 UTC|newest]

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