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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99693: ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:51:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112059-CVE-2026-99693-bb5d@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure

A migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an
in-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion
consumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again
without checking whether the assertion already consumed it.

The target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the
ALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the
sender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the
status arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration
that the target has already completed:

  Old-master sender                  Finishing assertion
  -----------------                  -------------------
  publish MLE; take in-use reference
  send ALL_DONE; wait for status
                                     take lookup reference
                                     unlink MLE
                                     put lookup and base references
  send returns a connection error
  put base reference again; free MLE
  put in-use reference; access freed MLE

dlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm->spinlock from the MLE lookup to
the final puts, and it takes dlm->master_lock around the unlink and the
puts. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the
assertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender's in-use
reference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a
later assertion no longer finds it.

An assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner
and cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at
that point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node
still holds the other nodes' locks and refmap bits, so it could neither
be purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration
does instead: drop those locks under res->spinlock if the target still
owns the lockres, and recalculate its usage.

Use the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the
target-death failure paths. The sender's in-use reference keeps the MLE
alive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful
migration retains its existing in-use-only put.

A target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its
death. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it
disconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message
handlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time
the DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the
domain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have
been answered.

Two windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler
switches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes' locks moments
later, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the
sender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting
for the target before giving up would only stretch the first window
into the time in which recovery of the target can observe it.

KASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593

Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0
 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0
 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0
 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0
 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110
 ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0
 ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440
 ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940
 generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490
 kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0
 deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120
 deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0
 cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450
 task_work_run+0x144/0x230
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 593:
 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0
 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0
 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0
 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0
 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110
 ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0
 ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440
 ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940

Freed by task 593:
 kmem_cache_free+0x242/0x580
 __dlm_put_mle+0x4b2/0x660
 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x1690/0x20d0
 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0
 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0
 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110
 ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0
 ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881190e3c00
 which belongs to the cache o2dlm_mle of size 480
The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
 freed 480-byte region [ffff8881190e3c00, ffff8881190e3de0)

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99693 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 2.6.16 with commit 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20
	Issue introduced in 2.6.16 with commit 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit 901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367
	Issue introduced in 2.6.16 with commit 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit 1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977
	Issue introduced in 2.6.16 with commit 6714d8e86bf443f6f7af50f9d432025649f091f5 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit 61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99693
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e328dd5207cc67bb283208b47b3a349b9ccd7a20
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/901b58081cc78ac3cca19eb0e2970cc5f187f367
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1696bbf1d6165421a4f7e15549645d96505b0977
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61469249aab03799b0d3294b7a0cd25dd303017a

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  5:58 UTC|newest]

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