From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-99694: ocfs2: do not index before the entry array when dividing an empty bucket
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 06:51:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026112059-CVE-2026-99694-0c69@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: do not index before the entry array when dividing an empty bucket
ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket() appends an empty bucket carrying a sentinel
hash when the source bucket has no divide position, taking that hash
from xh_entries[start - 1]. ocfs2_xattr_find_divide_pos() returns count
when every entry shares one hash, and its loop does not run at all for
count < 2, so an empty bucket comes back with start == count == 0 and
the read is xh_entries[-1].
That is outside the __counted_by_le(xh_count) bounds of xh_entries[] and
lands on the header, so the value picked up is
xh_count | xh_free_start << 16. One above it is written into the new
bucket's xh_entries[0] and committed, which leaves a bucket whose first
hash does not follow the bucket before it. ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find()
binary searches on xh_entries[0], so the broken key hides the range the
sentinel was meant to cover: getxattr() answers -ENODATA for an
attribute that is stored, and an insert can go to the wrong bucket and
leave two copies of a name. The cross cluster divide hands the same
value back as a tree record's e_cpos, which then claims a hash range it
does not cover.
Read xh_entries[0] instead. The branch is only reached when every entry
shares one hash, so for a non-empty bucket it holds the same value, and
for an empty one it is the slot that carries the bucket key.
An empty bucket reaches the divide from
ocfs2_check_xattr_bucket_collision(), which reports no collision for
one, through ocfs2_add_new_xattr_bucket() and
ocfs2_extend_xattr_bucket(). It does not take a failed set to get
there: a divide that finds no position is itself what leaves an empty
sentinel bucket behind, and a later extend can pick it as the target.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-99694 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 2.6.28 with commit 80bcaf3469b8aefd316d4ceb27d9af7cfbb0b913 and fixed in 6.12.118 with commit 58308e76c036822c78947efbbdcb800c1df6f6b2
Issue introduced in 2.6.28 with commit 80bcaf3469b8aefd316d4ceb27d9af7cfbb0b913 and fixed in 6.18.64 with commit 7148fa383fb000d3125989ff3e63f3458a33591d
Issue introduced in 2.6.28 with commit 80bcaf3469b8aefd316d4ceb27d9af7cfbb0b913 and fixed in 7.3.5 with commit b710975d07b049c957ba6b93985b1cf9b169ad6e
Issue introduced in 2.6.28 with commit 80bcaf3469b8aefd316d4ceb27d9af7cfbb0b913 and fixed in 7.4-rc2 with commit 7133a0d0954c109f1764ebf8ab32d7e757a6c587
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-99694
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58308e76c036822c78947efbbdcb800c1df6f6b2
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7148fa383fb000d3125989ff3e63f3458a33591d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b710975d07b049c957ba6b93985b1cf9b169ad6e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7133a0d0954c109f1764ebf8ab32d7e757a6c587
reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 5:58 UTC|newest]
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