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From: Tristan Madani <tristmd@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 12:50:39 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261121125039.2532663-1-tristmd@gmail.com> (raw)

From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>

construct_key() reads key->type->request_key without holding key->sem,
then calls the resulting actor function pointer.  While the
sys_request_key() syscall path holds key_types_sem for reading (via
key_type_lookup()), which prevents concurrent type removal, in-kernel
request_key() callers pass struct key_type directly without holding
key_types_sem.  If unregister_key_type() races with such a caller,
key_garbage_collector() can retype the key to key_type_dead and the
module text backing the original request_key method can be freed before
the actor call executes.

Take key->sem for reading around both the key->type->request_key lookup
and the actor() call, consistent with the approach used by 925c84e3cc21
("KEYS: Protect the read method check against type removal"),
51bcd09b9ffc ("KEYS: Protect the update method check against type
removal") and bab48a104447 ("KEYS: Protect the pkey method checks
against type removal") which protect analogous method dereferences in
the keyctl paths.

Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Hold key->sem across the actor() call, not just the type pointer read,
  matching the established pattern from the three prior fixes (Sashiko)
- Clarify that in-kernel request_key() callers do not hold key_types_sem
  so the race is reachable outside the syscall path (Sashiko)

 security/keys/request_key.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 22cd66a44da56..60a8cb5924e11 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -241,10 +241,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info,
 
 	/* Make the call */
 	actor = call_sbin_request_key;
+	down_read(&key->sem);
 	if (key->type->request_key)
 		actor = key->type->request_key;
 
 	ret = actor(authkey, aux);
+	up_read(&key->sem);
 
 	/* check that the actor called complete_request_key() prior to
 	 * returning an error */
-- 
2.47.3


             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 12:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21 12:50 Tristan Madani [this message]
2026-11-21 13:05 ` [PATCH v2] KEYS: protect construct_key type dereference with key semaphore sashiko-bot

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