From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, baijiaju1990@gmail.com,
jjzuming@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] keys: Protect the read method check against type removal
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:02:14 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2610922.1792425734@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <atY0fRZ_s5UQk8Fk@kernel.org>
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 10:57:21PM +0800, Cen Zhang wrote:
> > keyctl_read_key() checks key->type->read without holding key->sem.
> > A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing
> > its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC
> > is being unloaded:
> >
> > KEYCTL_READ task Module unload and key GC
> > ---------------- ------------------------
> > lookup_user_key()
> > permission / possession checks
> > load key->type
> > af_rxrpc_exit()
> > unregister_key_type()
> > GC: down_write(key->sem)
> > GC: retype to key_type_dead
> > GC: up_write(key->sem)
> > unregister_key_type() returns
> > free_module()
> > read saved type's read member
> >
> > The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in
> > __keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier
> > method check is outside that critical section.
> >
> > Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and
> > under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then
> > use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry.
> > The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type
> > unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed.
> >
> > Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read
> > method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result;
> > allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > Assisted-by: LLM
> > Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
>
> I literally described the fix to the reported bug instead of reviewing a
> bug fix. That means by practical means that you only reported a bug.
> This cannot happen again and if it does, next time I'll just do the
> right fix myself and commit to the Git because that matches the reality
> the best.
>
>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-19 16:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-19 14:57 [PATCH v2] keys: Protect the read method check against type removal Cen Zhang
2026-10-19 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-19 16:02 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-10-19 16:10 ` sashiko-bot
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2610922.1792425734@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
--to=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=baijiaju1990@gmail.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jjzuming@gmail.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=zzzccc427@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.