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From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 11:22:15 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2802481.ZiEtmME2xN@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <530F607A.8070200@tycho.nsa.gov>

On Thursday, February 27, 2014 10:57:46 AM Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 02/27/2014 09:30 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
> > DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
> > as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
> > memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
> > the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
> 
> So you think that the explanation given in the comment for the current
> ordering is no longer valid?

Yes and no.  Arguably there is still some value in it but there are enough 
problems with it as-is that I think the value is starting to be outweighed by 
the pain it is causing (Dan can be very annoying when he wants something <g>).  
For those users who still want notification of processes trying to mmap() low 
addresses, I think an audit watch is a much better approach.  I don't think 
SELinux shouldn't be acting as an intrustion detection tool when we have other 
things that do that job.

Let's also not forget that the MAC-before-DAC approach goes against the 
general approach to applying SELinux controls, so there is some argument to be 
had for consistency as well.

Do you have a strong objection to this patch?

-- 
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-02-27 16:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-27 14:30 [PATCH] selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls Paul Moore
2014-02-27 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 16:12   ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 16:22   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2014-02-27 16:26     ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 16:40       ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2014-02-27 16:42         ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 19:25       ` Paul Moore
2014-02-27 19:34         ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-02-27 19:52           ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 20:07             ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-27 20:55               ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-02-28 12:22               ` Paul Moore
2014-02-27 20:13 ` Stephen Smalley

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