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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 11:46:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <29898.1479728811@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161117123731.GA11573@wunner.de>

Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:

> We already have the efi_call_early() macro to call boot services
> in a manner that works across all arches and bitness variants.
> 
> In 4.10 there will be an efi_call_proto() macro to allow the same
> for protocol calls:
> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?h=efi/core&id=3552fdf29f01
> 
> I suggest adding an efi_call_runtime() macro for arch- and bitness-
> agnostic runtime services calls, like this:
> 
> #define efi_call_runtime(f, ...)					\
> 	__efi_early()->call(efi_table_attr(efi_runtime_services, f,	\
> 		__efi_early()->runtime_services), __VA_ARGS__)
> 
> For this to work you need to add a runtime_services attribute to struct
> efi_config, this requires modifying head_32.S and head_64.S, use commit
> 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services")
> as a template.
> 
> If you define corresponding efi_call_runtime() macros for ARM, you
> should indeed be able to share this function across arches.

I'm not sure why I need to do this if I replace get_secure_boot() from my
patch with a call to efi_get_secureboot().

David

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-21 11:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
     [not found]   ` <147933284407.19316.17886320817060158597.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 22:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40       ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:46     ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-21 19:58       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
     [not found]         ` <20161122104401.GC1552-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 10:49           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 10:49             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:52           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52             ` David Howells
     [not found]             ` <25371.1479826321-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 20:36               ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 20:36                 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:47         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02             ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <7199.1479826047-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 14:57         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:57           ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
     [not found]   ` <20161117123731.GA11573-JFq808J9C/izQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 11:42     ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:42       ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <29779.1479728545-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 11:52         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:52           ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]       ` <CAKv+Gu-frVDhzORDRZ6XT+FxewsTgrxhXmM=DqaS6Ns4mJhQ9g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 12:41         ` David Howells
2016-11-21 12:41           ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14           ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]             ` <CAKv+Gu8Lhm=u97hY1y+Y+Ladk=y7pSVNrow8ML1hQUJ9+74B-w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 15:17               ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:17                 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31       ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <147977469914.6360.17194649697208113702.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 10:20         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:20           ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58             ` Joe Perches
     [not found]             ` <1479826691.1942.11.camel-6d6DIl74uiNBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 15:52               ` David Howells
2016-11-22 15:52                 ` David Howells
     [not found]                 ` <24973.1479829961-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 16:25                   ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:25                     ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40                     ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51                       ` Joe Perches
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]       ` <CA+5PVA6F5qEnuL2UaXS9_fJ217J93cEZDDsz9Y2BPwHXcMdX-A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 12:10         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 12:10           ` Ard Biesheuvel
     [not found]   ` <CAKv+Gu_8r3oM-jvvuSiXTzxp0YMEVgc5KkScJ2UhGTaXm28L6w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 17:28     ` David Howells
2016-11-18 17:28       ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
     [not found] ` <147933283664.19316.12454053022687659937.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 21:48   ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49   ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49     ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27   ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 23:10     ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-22  6:12         ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58         ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21           ` Dominik Brodowski
     [not found]           ` <20161123192143.GA482-SGhQLRGLuNwb6pqDj42GsMgv3T4z79SOrE5yTffgRl4@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 17:34             ` David Howells
2016-11-24 17:34               ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19               ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49                 ` David Howells
     [not found]       ` <26173.1479769852-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-28 22:32         ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-28 22:32           ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11           ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23             ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03               ` David Howells
     [not found]                 ` <6973.1480428211-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 14:35                   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:35                     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41                   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 14:41                     ` One Thousand Gnomes
     [not found]                 ` <20161130144105.2b6be4fe-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-30 16:25                   ` David Howells
2016-11-30 16:25                     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40             ` David Howells
2016-11-16 22:28 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown Justin Forbes

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