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From: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, vbabka@suse.cz, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@magna.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.ogness@linutronix.de,
	akinobu.mita@gmail.com, glider@google.com, andreyknvl@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RESEND] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 16:15:20 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2de3a189-adca-4954-e2a3-c79fbe3eee96@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YCMFzCz8ootub9pH@elver.google.com>



On 2/9/21 3:59 PM, Marco Elver wrote:
> Would it be reasonable to make this non-static? Or somehow make it
> possible to get this flag from other subsystems?
> 
> There are other places in the kernel that dump sensitive data such as
> registers. We'd like to be able to use 'debug_never_hash_pointers' to
> decide if our debugging tools can dump registers etc. What we really
> need is info if the kernel is in debug mode and we can dump all kinds of
> sensitive info; debug_never_hash_pointers is would be a good enough
> proxy for that.

The next version of my patch (coming soon) will export the symbol.  It's 
intended for test_printf, but if you think it can be used by others, so 
much the better.



      reply	other threads:[~2021-02-09 22:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-02 21:36 [PATCH][RESEND] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed Timur Tabi
2021-02-03  3:24 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2021-02-03  3:30   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-02-03  9:54 ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-03 13:31   ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-03 18:58     ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-03 19:30       ` Andy Shevchenko
2021-02-03 20:02       ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 20:25         ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-03 20:35           ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 20:47             ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-03 21:56               ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-03 22:38                 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04  9:36               ` Petr Mladek
2021-02-05 10:59 ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-02-05 18:25   ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-10  0:24     ` Kees Cook
2021-02-09 21:59 ` Marco Elver
2021-02-09 22:15   ` Timur Tabi [this message]

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