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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, petkan@mip-labs.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/20] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring [ver #2]
Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 15:49:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <30190.1456760980@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1454932757.2648.143.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> > +    If restrict_link not NULL, it should point to a function will be called to
> > +    vet all attempts to link keys into the keyring, though this can be
> > +    overridden by passing KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to
> > +    key_create_or_update().
> 
> Please fix the first part of the sentence.   Maybe add an example of
> when it is appropriate to bypass the restriction - (eg. loading the
> builtin keys).

Okay:

    If restrict_link not NULL, it should point to a function that will be
    called each time an attempt is made to link a key into the new keyring.
    This function is called to check whether a key may be added into the keying
    or not.  Callers of key_create_or_update() within the kernel can pass
    KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check.  An example of using
    this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are set up when the
    kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys - provided they
    can be verified by a key the kernel already has.

    When called, the restriction function will be passed the keyring being
    added to, the key flags value and the type and payload of the key being
    added.  Note that when a new key is being created, this is called between
    payload preparsing and actual key creation.  The function should return 0
    to allow the link or an error to reject it.

David

  reply	other threads:[~2016-02-29 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-19 11:30 [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key " David Howells
2016-01-20 18:58   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:30     ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 19:31   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:27     ` David Howells
2016-02-08 13:34       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 13:55         ` David Howells
2016-02-08 15:03           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 15:53             ` How to add additional blacklist entries? David Howells
2016-02-08 16:32               ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 16:43                 ` David Howells
2016-02-08 19:28                   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-09 10:42                     ` David Howells
2016-02-10 14:07                       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-08 14:55         ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring [ver #2] David Howells
2016-02-08 16:39           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:48             ` David Howells
2016-01-20 20:26   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:29     ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:33   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:46     ` David Howells
2016-02-05 16:16       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] X.509: Don't treat self-signed keys specially " David Howells
2016-01-20 20:40   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-29 15:49     ` David Howells [this message]
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] X.509: Retain the key verification data " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:31 ` [RFC PATCH 12/20] PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding it " David Howells
2016-02-08 12:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:56     ` David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-02-08 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] IMA: Use the system blacklist keyring " David Howells
2016-02-10 19:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-19 11:58     ` David Howells
2016-02-19 12:16       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-01-19 11:32 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] IMA: Replace the .ima_mok keyring with the secondary system keyring " David Howells
2016-01-20 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH 00/20] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " Petko Manolov
2016-02-03 15:47   ` David Howells
2016-01-20 18:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-02-03 15:56   ` David Howells

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