From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, tgraf@infradead.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
davem@davemloft.net, a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, eparis@parisplace.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 16:43:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <34753.1293054216@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 22 Dec 2010 12:17:59 EST." <1293038279.9820.250.camel@dan>
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On Wed, 22 Dec 2010 12:17:59 EST, Dan Rosenberg said:
> On Wed, 2010-12-22 at 18:13 +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > * Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> >
> > > + case 'K':
> > > + /*
> > > + * %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test
> > > + * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
> > > + */
> > > + if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
> > > + WARN_ONCE(1, "%%pK used in interrupt context.\n");
> >
> > Hm, that bit looks possibly broken - some useful warning in irq context could print
> > a pointer into the syslog and this would generate a second warning? That probably
> > would crash as it recurses back into the printk code?
> The double "%%" acts as an escape and simply prints "%" rather than
> treating it as a format specifier.
I think Ingo was more worried about the fact that we're doing a WARN_ONCE which
will generate a call to printk() - while we're in the middle of a printk() already.
So if we hit a 'printk(KERN_INFO "Some blather with a %pK pointer in it",ptr) in irq
context, what we'll get (if we're lucky is:
Some blather with a <50-60 lines of WARN_ONCE output> pointer in it.
If we're unlucky? Well...
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-12-22 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-12-22 17:00 [PATCH v5] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 17:13 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-12-22 17:17 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 17:19 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 21:43 ` Valdis.Kletnieks [this message]
2010-12-22 17:35 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 21:26 ` Ingo Molnar
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