From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>,
SELinux Mail List <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: Clarification of labeled IPsec checks
Date: Fri, 03 May 2013 15:20 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <39078390.44gaRjNkjA@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51840BF4.7000302@tresys.com>
On Friday, May 03, 2013 03:11:48 PM Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> I'm doing some spring cleaning on refpolicy, cleaning out some old
> unused/unnecessary networking permissions. I'm trying to make sure I have
> the permissions checks straight, since labeled networking isn't common use.
> For labeled IPsec, we have the following permissions (assuming all policy
> capabilities are on--assume maximum checks):
>
> netif: ingress/egress
> node: sendto/recvfrom
> peer: recv
> association: sendto/recvfrom
>
> I'm told that association perms are checked in the following cases:
>
> sendto: when a packet leaves the box (legacy only) and when a SA/flow is
> checked recvfrom: when an incoming packet is queued on a socket (legacy
> only)
>
> Does "legacy only" mean the checks will eventually go away, or is it for a
> legacy IPsec configuration?
In this case "legacy" refers to a SELinux policy that doesn't have the netpeer
policy capability enabled.
It has been a while since we introduced the netpeer policy capability so I
imagine we could start a process of deprecating policies that don't enable it.
We could dump a warning message if someone loads a policy with the netpeer
capability disabled and then after a few releases (how many?) we could remove
the legacy bits from the kernel and reject policies which don't have the
netpeer capability set.
Thoughts?
--
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-03 19:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-05-03 19:11 Clarification of labeled IPsec checks Christopher J. PeBenito
2013-05-03 19:20 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2013-05-06 13:50 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2013-05-07 13:05 ` Paul Moore
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