From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Edward Shushkin Subject: Re: Proposal for keying encrypted filesystem Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2003 15:21:24 +0400 Sender: edward Message-ID: <3E8824B4.55C63A55@namesys.com> References: <200303282026.23543.phma@webjockey.net> <200303291155.40419.phma@webjockey.net> <3E85E338.CEAA7DC7@namesys.com> <200303301130.24136.phma@webjockey.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: list-help: list-unsubscribe: list-post: Errors-To: flx@namesys.com List-Id: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Cc: reiserfs-list@namesys.com Pierre Abbat wrote: > > On Saturday 29 March 2003 13:17, Edward Shushkin wrote: > > Any collision can be used by attacker for access to remained decrypted data > > in memory, so you should assign the *whole* output of any crypto-stable > > hash function (20 bytes for SHA1). If you use 19 bytes for ID, there is no > > any guarantee that someone can not find a collision easy. > > Edward. > > There isn't any guarantee with all 20 either, Yes of course, but with all the 20 bytes I have a guarantee of SHA1 stability announced in appropriate papers, and I do have nothing for 19 bytes.. it's just 256 times as hard to > find one and practically impossible. What about using the MD5 of the > passphrase for the key ID, and the SHA1 of the passphrase for the key? Each secret key must be generated by special method which is specific for the used crypto algorithm, I think such methods are already exists, so we don't need to invent something new.. Edward. > > phma > -- > .i toljundi do .ibabo mi'afra tu'a do > .ibabo damba do .ibabo do jinga > .icu'u la ma'atman.