Re: Proposal for keying encrypted filesystem

[Edward Shushkin <edward@namesys.com>]

Pierre Abbat wrote:
> 
> On Friday 04 April 2003 09:47, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> > Properly applied, you can even leverage it further - for instance, if your
> > backup process doesn't have the key tokens, you can safely let it have
> > access to all the files - it can read the 127 meg of data to back it up in
> > a bitwise manner, but it can't actually DO anything with the data - this is
> > something that you can't do in the "give everything the token" model....
> 
> Are you talking about the rsync process on Alice, the rsync process on Bob, or
> the process that Bob uses to make backups of all the encrypted backups that
> Alice and others entrust him with?
> 
> If a process that has no key tokens attempts to read an encrypted file with
> the ordinary syscalls, does it get an error or the ciphertext?

Error. Wanna backup - give a valid key, and backups will be cpu-expensive.. 
Edward.

> Should there
> be a token that allows a process to read and write the ciphertext of an
> encrypted file? Will rsync need to be modified to be able to r/w the key ID
> of an encrypted file?
> 
> phma
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