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From: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Junfeng Yang <yjf@stanford.edu>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [CHECKER]  Help Needed!
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2003 17:40:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3EA410F4.2050809@colorfullife.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <p7365p8x8qu.fsf@oldwotan.suse.de>

Andi Kleen wrote:

>Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> writes:
> 
>  
>
>>P.S.: On i386, you can access both kernel and user space after
>>set_fs(KERNEL_DS), or if you use __get_user() and bypass
>>access_ok(). Thus the __get_user() in arch/i386/kernel/traps.c,
>>function show_registers is correct. This is the only instance I'm
>>aware of where this is used, and noone else should be doing that. It
>>fails on other archs, e.g. on sparc.
>>    
>>
>
>It is used in a couple more of places in the x86-64 architecture specific
>code. Of course it is legal there too.
>
>Also there are some corner cases; e.g. some architecture specific
>code (particularly the 32bit emulations) just does access_ok or 
>get_user/put_user (with implied access_ok) on the first element 
>of a structure and then accesses the other elements with __*_user.
>This works because these architectures have an unmapped hole at the 
>end of the user address space.
>  
>
This is different bug:
- bug 1 is access user space without the functions from <asm/uaccess.h>, 
or access user space after set_fs(KERNEL_DS), or access kernel space 
without set_fs(KERNEL_DS).
- bug 2 is not enough access_ok() calls, e.g. __put_user without a 
preceeding access_ok() check, either explicit or implicit due to an 
copy_from_user().

--
    Manfred



  reply	other threads:[~2003-04-21 15:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <3EA3B87B.60505@colorfullife.com.suse.lists.linux.kernel>
2003-04-21 13:47 ` [CHECKER] Help Needed! Andi Kleen
2003-04-21 15:40   ` Manfred Spraul [this message]
2003-04-21  9:23 Manfred Spraul
2003-04-21 19:15 ` Junfeng Yang
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2003-03-27 17:10 [CHECKER] potential dereference of user pointer errors Chris Wright
2003-04-21  7:49 ` [CHECKER] Help Needed! Junfeng Yang
2003-04-21 21:26   ` Chris Wright

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