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From: selinux list <selinux_list@yahoo.it>
To: SELinux mailing list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: about the safety problem in SELinux
Date: Wed, 14 May 2003 19:13:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3EC2792D.1020209@yahoo.it> (raw)

I'm studying the well known ¨safety problem¨ stated the first time in an 
old article by Harrison, Ruzzu, Ullman.
I know there exist lots of different security models that try to address 
the problem of guarantee the safety of a protection system (in a few 
words, a generic configuratrion of a protection system is said to be 
safe if there is no leakage of any generic right from that 
configuration; in other words there is no propagation of rights). Type 
Enforcement should be safe for default. If I am not wrong it has been 
demonstrated RBAC is not safe in general. There are some 
constraint-oriented  approaches which seems to be good in providing safety.

What about SELinux?

I know some of the people who subscribed this mail list are not sure 
SELinux is safe. But in the Flask doc it's written the control over 
right propagation is provided by ensuring that the security policy is 
consulted every time an object has to be accessed (e.g. for every 
security decision). Another thing that let me guess SELinux should be 
safe is that almost everything is configured by TE (RBAC support is very 
poor) and, above all, it is statically configured.
How could a subject acquire a right which is not granted by the security 
policy?
It sounds to me it's trivial to say SELinux is safe but it's a 
formidable task to configure the security policy in a way it can be 
considered secure.

Is it right what I am thinking about or I am on the wrong way?

(I am developing a small tool for policy analisis purpose, for my 
Graduate School Thesis,  and if SELinux is safe it would be of more 
value...)

Thank you and sorry if what I wrote is silly ;)

Giorgio



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             reply	other threads:[~2003-05-14 17:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-05-14 17:13 selinux list [this message]
     [not found] ` <200305150539.40186.russell@coker.com.au>
     [not found]   ` <3EC2C366.5060901@yahoo.it>
2003-05-15 12:50     ` about the safety problem in SELinux Stephen Smalley
2003-05-15 16:31       ` slow application of contexts in devfs? Christopher J. PeBenito
2003-05-15 19:02         ` Stephen Smalley
2003-05-15 23:45           ` Russell Coker
2003-05-16  3:12             ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2003-05-16  5:13               ` Russell Coker
2003-05-16 11:40               ` Stephen Smalley
2003-05-17 17:05                 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2003-05-17 19:11                   ` Russell Coker
2003-05-18  5:01                     ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2003-05-19 12:37                     ` Stephen Smalley
2003-05-19 11:39                   ` Stephen Smalley
2003-05-19 13:10                     ` Russell Coker
2003-05-19 14:35                     ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2003-07-02 23:18       ` SE Linux mentioned in large Australian newspaper website Faye

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